Critical Thinking Historical Analysis

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz – Last revision: October 30th, 2024.

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1978 Cambodia Viet Nam War

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

“In history there have frequently been wars which, in spite of all the horrors, brutalities, calamities and suffering inevitable in every war, were progressive wars, i.e., were useful to the development of mankind, by assisting in the demolition of particularly harmful and reactionary institutions…” V.I. Lenin

The 1978 conflict between Democratic Kampuchea (DK) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), two socialist states, defied traditional MarxistLeninist theory on the causes of war, revolutionary visavis reactionary forces. The socialist Indochinese Democratic Front had been collaborating on elimination of imperialist powers from Southeast Asian soil since 1936. Yet the socialist fabric of international brotherhood shredded revealing long tempered social and political differences between the DK and SRV. But were long term issues or recent developments the cause of war? Could outside intervention from other more powerful states have coerced these states into an inevitable conflict?

The identifying of the all possible causes of the SRV’s invasion is the goal of this case study. There is continuing resentment amongst the three states making up the Indochinese peninsula. This wellknown local proverb explains the traditional stereotypes of the region, “The Vietnamese plant the rice, the Cambodians watch it grow, and the Thais sell it.” Vietnam’s high population density and limited arable land caused a historic sense of envy for the fertile Cambodian plains. The Khmer nation has been well aware of this fact. The Cambodians have viewed themselves as caught between the tiger (Vietnam) and the crocodile (Thailand) and since the 19th century have been a battleground over control of its rice fields. This economic issue is a possible cause of the conflict. For centuries tensions have mounted between the Cambodians, the first settlers of the peninsula and of South Asian ancestry, and East Asian Vietnamese that slowly encroached from the north. This pulsing migration and occasional domination by the Vietnamese, never clearly demarcated an agreeable common border. Oddly, these two intermingled ethnic groups have been fairly cooperative when faced with an outside aggressor, yet rapidly less tolerant when prodded with ideas of nationalism.

The internecine desires were frozen during the imperial French occupation. The boundaries demarcated by the French, which in reality saved Cambodia from extinction, did not take into account postcolonial interests. Additionally, seeds of distrusted were unknowingly sown by French authorities when they employed Vietnamese in the civil administration in colonial Cambodia. The lack of an agreed upon postcolonial border satisfying Cambodia’s and Vietnam’s interests, rather than the French decision of what was just, can also be considered a reason. War as a diversion from domestic issues is a consideration. The Soviet Union was pouring three million dollars a day in the SRV to keep it from collapsing but after decades of strife, the Hanoi leadership was in no position to gain support from a populace concerned with rebuilding. Also, an economic policy imitating a Stalinist model of massive industrialization did not include an offense war. In this instance, war as a diversion in this case does not meet the minimum requirements for a rational cause. The bulk of foreign aid to these two newly independent states consisted of military hardware. An arms race of weapons pointed towards an eventual conflict. Since early 1975, the SRV had been receiving heavy offensive weapons, tanks and artillery, from the Soviets. Numerically outnumbering the Khmer Rouge forces 2 to 1, the SRV with heavy armor and overwhelming air power, the SRV had absolute superiority on the battlefield.

The Khmer Rouge military power was myth. Pol Pot’s main claim to the invincibility of his forces was the defeat of the American backed government of Lon Nol, which deflated more by corruption and belief in astrology. Red China was supplying massive amounts of heavy artillery and technical advances to the Khmer Rouge. But as a modern fighting force was untrained and poorly lead, all imported weaponry and technologies had to be manned by Red Chinese and North Korean military advisors. With its technical superiority and battle hardened troops, the SRV unleashing its dogs of war because of assured victory is a definite possibility. Such an imbalance of real power favoring the SRV, might have caused an irrational fear based response by Pol Pot. If the DK sensed SRV viewed it as weak and the opportunity to strike was at hand, the DK may have been mobilizing for a first strike. Pol Pot believed the ethic Cambodian population in southern Vietnam, the Khmer Krom, would rise up in support assuring victory. Radio Phnom Penh began airing decrees to eliminate the Vietnamese race. The DK placed over half of its divisions into the Parrot’s Beak in Srey Vang to launch such an attack. The Vietnam’s cause for the conflict may have been seizing this opportunity on a tactical blunder placing the Khmer Rouge forces in a position to be easily outflanked and cut off, leaving an open route to Phnom Penh.

The SRV did not have a deterrent to behavior in regards to loss of foreign aid for re-development. Decimated by war and being a showcase for Moscow’s Marxistbacked liberation, gave it unshakable support from the Soviet Union and its satellites. As a member of COMECON, being labeled a pariah with the threat of economic sanctions from the free world would not have influenced their decision not to attack. Lack of economic deterrents can also be considered as a cause. In 1978, Vietnam’s reliance on trade with COMECON was 27 times greater in exports and imports 59 times greater in imports than than Cambodia. The amount of trade with COMECON shows the importance the Soviet block put on the SRV survival. With no trade statistics available between the DK and SRV during the 19751978, we can guess that it was at a low level. The theory of increased trade as a deterrent to war applies in this scenario. The emphasis placed on SRV’s survival the Kremlin may have been a confidence boost in its own imperialistic ambitions in the peninsula. The DK domestic policy of selfreliance to obtained “Perfect Sovereignty,” proceeded without any regards for the amount of human lives ground into the mortar of its construction. Can there be doubt that this fanaticism also influenced foreign policy in regards to its neighbors?

Pol Pot was willing to sacrifice incalculable amounts of Khmer soldiers for priority number one irredentism for lost mythical lands of Angkor civilization. Vietnamese intelligence networks, long in operation throughout Indochina and the defecting Khmer Rouge cadres of theEastern Zone units, doubly assured Hanoi of Phnom Penh’s intentions. A better now than later while there is an advantage could have forced Vietnam’s hand as the deciding factor. Even with the threat of Chinese invasion from the north, a stronger DK on its flank in the future would have been a great disadvantage. Political rivalry between the two states transferred from the colonial period to the united front and on into independence. The many of the upper echelon Khmer Rouge cadres before the fall of the Lon Nol Government were trained and based in Vietnam. Often treated as second rate in a system that theoretically repudiated class, they resented being chess pieces in a Vietnamese led plan to unite the peninsula. The fall of Phnom Penh arrived sooner than the Vietnamese had planned setting the stage for Khmer Nationalism to emerge counter to long term goals.

The rise of Angkar as the leadership for Cambodian communism focused its foreign policy propaganda on the enemy within. Pol Pot’s paranoia placed the CIA, KGB, and Hanoi all in a collaborative role as threats to the DK. As a result, all foreign entities were viewed with suspicion. Eventually this paranoia developed into a purge of these foreign elements in the Khmer Regime. The main targets of these thrusts were the Youn, the DK’s civilians of Vietnamese descent, cadres previously trained in Vietnam, or with any marital relationships with enemies. The Khmer cadres in the Eastern Zone bordering Vietnam were suspected of collaborating with foreign elements. As these purges progressed, military forces and civilians began pouring into Vietnam. This alerted Hanoi not only to the eventual invasion to regain lost territories but of genocide taking place. The magnitude of these atrocities and Vietnam’s ability to stop it can be considered a major cause of the conflict on moral grounds. For months up to the conflict, border incidents involving DK’s incursions, seem a probable cause. Though easily repulsed, in the wake of these counterattacks were moved border markers and the massive slaughter of innocent Vietnamese civilians. The repeated heavy artillery shelling and aggressive statements emanating from Phnom Penh to wipe out the Vietnamese race, may have forced Hanoi’s action on based on international law. A proportionate response in an attempt to stop these threats would have been appropriate. With the previous idea at hand, one must consider Leninist ideology in dealing with exporting revolution.

The communist had a long history of dual overt and covert policies to obtain goals. By overtly declaring an invasion, justifying it as a humanitarian action, the SRV could obtain the covert goal of dominating the region. Right before the conflict, the SRV had over 20,000 members in Kampuchean United Front for National Construction and Defense (KNUFNS) to be used as a propaganda unit in raising support for opposition to the Pol pot regime. Ideology has to a considered as a factor for the war. Before the invasion, the UN declined the DK’s request to put a neutral stabilizing force on the disputed border and suggested bilateral agreements as the solution. Hanoi’s protests to the Phnom Penh about forays into its territory were responded with statements that it was unaware and had not authorized these actions. This attitude towards ignoring diplomacy and inaction by the UN to separate opposing forces may also have been an additional factor. The desire for a proxy battleground by Washington, , Moscow, and Beijing to settle differences is a possibility. In combination, all three powers manipulating the region could have aggravated the conflict to a boiling point.

The U.S. posturing itself as not supporting any UN mandates against the DK in its irredentist demands in hopes of punishing the SRV, coupled with warmer relations with Beijing in widening the SinoSoviet rift added to the fire. Beijing, switching support to the DK to seize on the vacuum left by American withdrawal and to isolate the Russian supported liberation of Vietnam plays into the competition for legitimate leadership of the socialist world. It would seem Moscow would whole heartedly supported Hanoi in eliminating Red China’s ally then taking another state under its wing. The Soviets in their endless search for a warm water ports throughout the cold war would have welcomed dominance of the peninsula and the possible control of the Straits of Malacca. Did the financial and politic support given to obtain goals place Hanoi in the role of a Kremlin puppet? Strangely enough, Vietnam’s invasion to destroy the Khmer Rouge was done without Moscow’s blessing and does not leverage as a cause. Political maneuvering to link issues complicated the situation. Irrational leadership placing personal goals in front of true national interests created an environment were dialog was near impossible between the two bickering states. One cannot ignore the attention put on the region by the major powers on a already hazardous situation. For whatever reason is chosen as the source of the conflict, no matter the various actions, reactions, and policies of all parties involved, undoubtedly will depend on the theoretical perspective of the analysis.

Anastas Mikoyan

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The career of Anastas Mikoyan is that of a legendary survivor under Soviet rule. Popularity and effectiveness are rarely found in any political career that lasts over four decades. Examining his life is an opportunity not to summarize categorically his accomplishments, rather which events and decisions he made early in life propelled him onto the stage of high level Soviet politics. The development of his political skills and personal characteristics before and during the Russian revolution focus the spotlight on him for the remainder of his career.

The obstacles in moving the Soviet economy from the peasant fields of the steppes to the heavy industrial output took men of dedication as well as intelligence. Are such characteristics of great men a matter of fate or natural talent? History shows it is a often a combination of yet the early life of Revolutionary Mikoyan displays something additional, compassion for his fellow man be it friend or foe . Destiny placed him in the most opportune place under extraordinary conditions forging more than just a hardened Bolshevik.

There is a need to first consider Mikoyan’s vantage point in writing his memoirs and the reader’s viewpoint. Publishing the book under the eyes of Soviet censors causes enumerable references to decisions made following proper MarxistsLeninist principles. Countering this it was dedication to principles, be it radical for the time, as a major factor in his overcoming the hopeless situations he fell into. To balance the claim one often writes highly of ones self there are more references to influential comrades and the endearing praise of their sacrifices for him and the principals of Proletarian brotherhood. The passion of revolutionary fervor is equaled by compassion for his comrades and sympathy for his enemies. His fondness for the memories of hardships shared with his comrades displays an altruistic nature not often found when men are placed in turbulent circumstances. We are as fortunate as this clever Armenian has written detailed account of the revolutionary life in the Caucusus. Wherein so many early Bolsheviks faced Imperial firing squads or Stalinist purges, this account speaks for many silenced voices.

The Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan recount his early life Sanain, Armenia and young adulthood in the Caucuses₁. In his childhood he developed like any other Armenian boy, tending the family sheep, learning the complexity of extended family hierarchy, and a destiny fulfilling his part. Armenia was dominated by Czarist Russia for the last two centuries and recently being developed by foreign investment one would predict a nationalistic spirit would sprout in young Anastas. His father was a traveling carpenter and his oldest brother employed in a nearby copper smelting plant, exposed him to foreign peoples and ways.₂ Comparing workers’ conditions in the factory and the elite bourgeois lifestyle of the French engineers and managers occupied his curiosity more than thoughts of national independence. While occasionally watching the French houses he saw children selling berries to the factory management’s wives. He seized upon this opportunity and decided to spend his free time gathering and selling berries. While berries were in season he was able to earn more income than his brother at the smelter.

Copying and improving on other’s ideas, we have the early beginning of a future trade minister. He witnessed the horrid conditions at the local smelter noting the abundance of foreign workers, mainly Greeks in the mines and Persians doing menial tasks. These workers were escaping oppression in their home countries and in being exiles were paid less for their labor. After this he writes the walks past the homes of the French with their elite lifestyle caused a deep sense of injustice. This is one of his first exposures to the realities of universal oppression of labor. His father’s work in Tiblis, Georgia exposed him to many languages and this knowledge he passed on to young Anastas. Anastas’ abilities at learning these new tongues became a focal point of his father’s pride. When Anastas finished basic schooling his father tried to get him a job at the smelter. The close friendship with the foreman resulted in no employment and about of Mikoyan’s small stature not be able to tolerate the work. The decision was made by his parents to send him off to continue his education.

Higher learning unfortunately in territories under czarists rule brought Russification policies to thwart nationalistic tendencies.₃ The Armenian solution was to use the monastery schools to educate their elites. The curriculum was unsupervised by Czarist bureaucrats as they classified them as religious institutions allowing creation of an educated class of future patriotic Armenians. Coming from a poor peasant family, his good marks in school and a petition from his father enabled him to obtain a scholarship at the Tiflis Nersesyan Armenian Religious School.₄ The exposure to a more demanding curriculum also brought him into new influences from classmates and educators including Marxist ideology. He passionately devoured books on history, economics, and natural sciences though he admits the science was often beyond his comprehension.₅The language barrier seemed an easy hurdle, he learned German using a dictionary to translate Das Kapital. The revolutionary materials shared amongst the schoolmates were illegal and this made them all the more attractive. It took extra study time outside the classroom and he feverishly dedicates early mornings before class to his revolutionary studies. Mikoyan became well versed with Karl Marx’s theories and in one incident challenged a teacher’s classroom criticism. When he asked the teacher exactly where in Das Kapital he had quoted Marx, the teacher could not find it the hidden copy Anastas pulled out.

Claiming it was from another translated addition, Anastas revealed a copy of that book and demanded the proof. The teacher lost the debate based on Mikoyan’s articulate presentation of the facts. Why should his challenge be significant? Here in a relentless debate, Mikoyan passionately argues not Marx’s prescribed values as the truth but rather defends the facts. His later speeches at worker’s rallies in Baku, he will call out for the truth in the face of any adversary, no matter their numbers. Another event teaching a hard political lesson was an organized student walkout. In an effort to extract an apology from a very rude instructor, the class unanimously decided to walkout until his removal Mikoyan placed great faith in the fact that no one would defect and would adhere to the group decision. Gullible Anastas was greatly hurt by the betrayal by a few members who gave in after a few days rather than risk expulsion. One by one the returned to class but the dean took notice and removed the instructor. Would this create further resistance to solidarity in future rebellious acts? Unfortunately not, time and time again in his early revolutionary career, he would fall victim to traitorous actions. Traitors amongst the rebel ranks will be a reoccurring theme that eventually hardens Mikoyan.

The disbelief in a God as a higher power solidified during his years at the seminary. He questioned a priest during religious scriptures studies over the unjustifiable suffering in the world. His argument was that if god was so almighty how could he allow the poverty, injustice, and oppression of his people. An intense argument in which he retained full composure even won over the class to his viewpoint. Furthering his rebellion and adherence to personal beliefs, he refused to take in his exam in religion and was threatened with expulsion. Eventually conceding, he scored a “C”, this stubbornness to believe only in logical ideology influenced his attraction to Marxism. The fellowship of students formed a Marxists circle to continue their studies. They became aware of the need to spread the ideology amongst other schools and began attending illegal workers’ conferences. His activism at these secret meetings anointed Mikoyan as a voice for the student movement and his enthusiasm brought the attention of veteran Marxists. His status as a student gave him exemption from military service but he soon left school to become a member of the Bolshevik party. In Georgia however, there was not much industrial production resulting in organizable groups of workers. The destiny of the Transcaucus region changes directions with the fall of the Czar and transparent independence movements. Nearby Baku, a rich industrial city based on oil refining, was flush with foreign workers of various religions and political ideologies and after the czar’s fall, a democratic government was formed. From Bolsheviks and Social Democrats, to land and factory owners, this all encompassing Baku government was threatened by an advancing Turkish Army.

The Bolsheviks operating legally in Baku sent a letter to Bolshevik Party leader in Georgia, requesting an Armenian speaking party organizer to increase the ranks. After being unable to convince any of the experienced party members to come to the Baku Bolsheviks’ aid, young Mikoyan was offered the job. He was apprehensive that he could not handle such a responsibility as a propagandist. Finally he was convinced to accept with repeated assurances that all would be fine as he would have a job there as well as satisfying party work. Mikoyan headed to Baku only to discover no job or housing was available through the Bolsheviks’ connections. The abundance of workers and teetering democratic government produced fertile ground for party organizing to keep him well occupied. At this point the motivated Mikoyan steps into a political combat zone ill prepared for the political intrigue ahead. With no job and income for rent he had to reside at the Bolshevik Worker’s Party office, sleeping on stacks of newspapers. Being unemployed he is the only one who can man the office during the day and becomes a focal point of party activity. In additional beyond the daily struggle to survive life he walked endlessly mile after mile to various factories to speak at the cafeterias.

The Bolsheviks were an accepted part of the government at this time operating above ground organization. Their weapons of choice being the printing press and public speeches. Mikoyan’s education and studies are well suited for this environment but the hard living is taking its toll on his health. As the Turks overran the Caucasus and head east into Baku, a united front of all parties defend the city. The defending units are slowly being pushed back in to Baku and The Bolsheviks requested assistance from Lenin in Moscow. He replied that they were fighting almost a dozen nations on various fronts and you are on their own.₆ The orders were to react and adjust accordingly with the situation. This would have devastating consequences for the Bolsheviks as the imminent final thrust of the Turkish attack brought a split in the government. The right wing parties and moderate Social Democrats favored inviting the British in to defend the city. The Bolsheviks as a minority opposed this and withdrew from the government. While the entrenched Red Guards held back the Turks, the other defenders began to splinter, Mikoyan as a front line commissar experienced this treachery first hand. The front slowly collapses and with the Turks one train station away, Anastas learned the Baku government did invite in British Military forces. Mikoyan hurried back to the city were the Bolsheviks decided to escape to avoid capture by the Turks .

The decision was made for the main thirty Bolshevik leaders to sail north to Astrakhan into Red Army held territory. The thirty fleeing Bolsheviks while trying to conceal their identities were discovered by British Naval Forces patrolling the Caspian Sea. A spy on board the ship betrayed the Bolsheviks and they were imprisoned by the local government. Mikoyan reflects back on this time and sates that the local authorities who claimed to invite in British Military assistance were puppets of the Imperialists and should be labeled traitors. To make a long tale short, of the 30 captured Bolshevik leaders, a list of 26 names was found hidden in someone’s pocket and they were eventually taken away for execution. By absolute luck Mikoyan name was not on the list leaving him and a handful of men to try and revive the Bolshevik cause in Baku. Anastas dedicates much of the inspiration throughout his life on the memory of these fallen 26 comrades. Remarkably he does not realize the danger in being a Bolshevik as he will fall victim to repeated arrests through carelessness and the Judases among them. The experience in prison is well detailed and is an excellent historical accountant of the realities of the times. What factors most heavily into the story of Mikoyan’s rise is his reaction to his predicament.

The Baku Communist leadership destroyed and remnants isolated from Moscow, Anastas develops a strategy not only escape but to restore the Bolshevik movement. He sees the need to attack on two fronts, fight the system legally and subversively. Applying this to his imprisonment he challenges the validity of their imprisonment in that a democratically elected government in Baku before British occupation. So now with the British there on an invitation this did not give them the right to arrest citizens. He contacts the Baku government hoping to obtain release while simultaneously they are sending secret messages about escape plans and bribes for the prison authorities. During his imprisonment Mikoyan’s sharpens his political skills by observing human behavior, calculating everything to his advantage. He shows great attention to detail in understanding the motivation and minds of his enemies yet never seems to have malicious intent towards them. His conversations with imprisoning authorities are civil yet all the while he tries to lure their sympathies for the Communist cause.

A pressuring tactic the invokes on officials is the thought that one day the Bolsheviks would be inevitably be in power and they should behave justly least the be one day judged. In additional to this moral philosophy the offer of thousands of rubles or threatened violence from his friends on the outside usually accomplished the task. Anastas begins to do well in the ways of the Bolsheviks, often the victim of a traitor, he always attempts to gain the trust of the opposition waiting for an opportune moment to strike. Miraculously after a few months the legal petitions (and bribes) by the few remaining Bolsheviks in Baku are successful. Mikoyan upon his return to Baku is faced with monumental tasks:

Cut off from Moscow support they have little or no money, literature, weapons.
Workers groups are factory based and not unified under one banner.
Their leadership ranks are greatly diminished and no access to printing presses.
The leftwing Muslim workers organizations will not join under Bolshevik leadership.
Nationalist movements are gaining across the Caucasus based on borders not class.
Social Democrats are the majority in most workers’ organizations and government.
British are now occupying Baku and in alliance with bourgeois class and government.

To resolve the nationalistic tendencies in the region, Mikoyan traveled to conferences in Armenia and Georgia. The revolutionary forces there were less organized, anxious to seize power with a small power base, and not willing to join an AllCaucus Communist Party. They hope for Communist rule within their respective borders. The nationalistic communist groups against Mikoyan’s advice revolt and are eventually destroyed by the ruling counterrevolutionary governments. He also while in this regions communicates and attempt to support the partisan bands in the North Transcaucus mountain region. The realization is that they are at the rear of the counterrevolutionary forces pressuring the entrenched Red Army in Astrakhan. Mikoyan sees the needs to have any and every rebellious group under Communist influence. When the time comes for the vanguard of the proletarian to seize power, he wants no postrevolution power struggle. To regenerate the Communist worker movement in Baku, Mikoyan follows a two tier approach.

First to legally win Bolshevik seats on elected workers councils by increasing their ranks in the factories. Since most workers were apathetic to politics, they easily won positions of leadership by manipulating those that did vote. Economic life in Baku was deteriorating rapidly giving great momentum to Communist sympathy. As a legitimately elected voice for the workers they can confront the government on issues but it is only a tactic to gain more support amongst the city’s population. The Bolsheviks fear with living deteriorating conditions, workers will protest and strike without the proper political leadership (Bolshevik). This would allow the government back by British military might to squash the revolts at the individual factories. Mikoyan realizes that a strike if called must be accomplished citywide and be politically based to be effective. He becomes an effective politician in holding these groups together as he keeps focus on the long term plan of seizing power not just economic concessions. Consolidation of power took may forms for he Bolsheviks.

Mikoyan tactics included not only winning control and support of workers in large factories but small as well. They tapped into the thousands of workers in the service industries which had previously ignored. Mikoyan pointed this out as an important correction because service workers with permits to travel between districts gave them access to better communication. The political apathy among the majority of servicebased workers made Communist seizure of their organization easier than in factories. A large percentage of them did not vote in election of their representatives so the Bolsheviks easily manipulated those that did vote. Additional supporters were torn from the radical wings of other workers’ parties discontent with conditions and inaction, The hardest groups to unite with were the Muslim workers organizations, the Gummet of Azerbaijan and Adelet in Baku . Mikoyan had received additional party organizers and literature to address this this but could not make any progress in their following Bolshevik leadership.

A majority of the workers belonged to the two Muslim parties and it was essential they fall into Bolshevik control. If a revolt was successful in overthrowing the government, these three groups could turn on each other in a battle for control. Anastas feared a joint declaration with the other groups as an unacceptable solution. The brilliant Mikoyan devised a matrix for command and control based on small cells. The previous loss of the 26 Baku Communists was devastating so if the current leadership was captured people were inline to replace them. All these efforts begin to coagulate as the conditions in Baku begin to rapidly fall apart economically and the Bolshevik ideology becomes more attractive. There is also an increase of persecution of the Bolsheviks as the Baku government becomes more desperate. Officials offer the Communistcontrolled Worker’s Conference to join the government. Mikoyan proposes that this would be suicide as they would then be under close government scrutiny and easily infiltrated. By this time young Anastas is becoming a remarkable strategists coordinating steps based on predicting results and possible retaliation by counterrevolutionary forces but as a tactician he blunders.

Declaring that the leading party members need to take extreme care not to be detained, he is soon arrested twice more and almost caught a third time. As per usually decries the illegality of the charges while simultaneously attempting bribes to officials for his release. He did manage one jail escape by switching identities with another man. It is hard to determine if Mikoyan is unaware how dangerous it is to be held and possibly executed, at each arrest Anastas is calm and cooperative with the police without an inch of resistance. Internally two situations arose which deeply troubled Mikoyan. The militant wing wanted to strike against the the 15,000 occupying British Forces before they had citywide popular support. Believing this to be suicide, Anastas argues for them to wait until Red Army forces were about to enter Baku.

A convincing political leader he was as the Red Army was barely holding its own still bottled up in Astrakhan and months away from capturing Baku. Anxious to strike many workers groups if still with jobs were not being paid. He feared such small factory based strikes would be crushed yet unable to convince them to wait for a citywide general strike. Economic strikes he feared would only weaken the proletariats as the controlling capitalists could hold out, in his opinion only a massive strike with political aims would have any results.

Yet with their decision to push forward, Mikoyan decides they need the Workers Conference support, and organizes marches, speeches, and publications. Anastas himself made public speeches at supportive rallies and often had to be whisked out the back door upon the arrival of the police. Every opportunity to stamp the image of the Communist leadership on any viable alternative to British backed Social Democrats Rule. Unbelievable the small economic strike was success and the workers received their back pay. Interaction with the British Military Administration always proved interesting, though they were enemies, Anastas always was cordial and enthusiastic to understand what motivated them. He always asked them how home sick they were and pointed out that the Bolshevik were not antiBritish but any occupying force would be universally opposed. He looked for common ground in his conversations and repeatedly ask for their support. Again the reasoning would be that one day when the Soviets were back in power, no one should fear reprisal on their actions today. His conversations with British soldiers who had communist sympathies however lead to frustration as Mikoyan says he was mystified by the mentality of the British.

The Bolsheviks lead a massive celebration and parades on May Day 1919. During this time the British soldiers are locked in and confined to barracks to keep them isolated from revolutionary ideological displays. Anastas hoped for infiltration into the soldiers ranks but had only two minimal English speakers party members and their attempts at printing English literature was in the words of the British commanders, comical. To counter discontent amongst the home sick troops a policy of frequent rotation was used. Closing the May Day celebration, in a speech in front of the main government building, Mikoyan declares that by the same time next year, Soviet power would be reinstated in Baku and all of Azerbaijan. As time passed more and more former exiled Communist residents began to slip into Baku from their exile in Astrakhan. These additional members Mikoyan wisely directed into rural areas ignored by the party to gain support of the peasantry and mountain peoples. Again he does not want these growing “Green Forces” to develop politically independence and insists that they are included in the proletarian struggle. As August rolls around the British are turning slowly evacuating and turning over power to the Social DemocraticBourgeois coalition government.

Many of the Bolsheviks during this occupation were captured and executed. In the eyes of revolutionaries these were terrorist acts and they wanted reprisals in the form of violence. Again the persuasive Mikoyan convinced them it was not productive stating while emotionally it would serve its purpose, politically would be bad especially for the their image as the potential future leadership of Baku. This time is ripening for the seizure of political power when suddenly Lenin calls for a party conference in Moscow. Mikoyan is chosen to lead a group to go to Moscow to speak with Lenin about the situation in Baku and attend the party conference. Under Mikoyan’s leadership they revived the party and had made great strides in building up military forces and espionage in the Caspian Region. It seems like the absolute wrong time for him to depart. They plan is made to sail to Astrakhan in two groups with most important figures boarding at the last minute. The guise of heading to Persia as tobacco merchants along with other identities is chosen. Persia as a destination goes straight into the heart of the British Forces and they believe local authorities would never suspect this as an escape route. Their hopes for the small engined sail boats is to encounter poor weather which would keep the opposing naval forces in safely harbored. Their wish is granted but on a grand scale as storms batter their journey to Astrakhan. Approaching Astrakhan the weather calms and to their dismay a naval vessel approaches. A great change has occurred in Mikoyan rather that protest if captured they decide to raise a white flag and when boarded shoot it out with the opposing forces. The cautious Anastas inspires his comrades to fight to the and take out as many enemy as possible. The vessel is from Red Navy and he convince the boarding party of their true identities and our taken to Astrakhan to meet Kirov.

In Astrakhan conditions are much worse than he imagines. His memoirs praise Kirov’s efforts and talents immensely in holding the Red Army and city together. His observations of Kirov’s personality and political skills during his command gives great insight into his future popularity in the soon to form Soviet Union. He learns that on most fronts the tide is turning in favor of the Red Army and soon heads off to Moscow. The task of getting to Moscow is difficult and Anastas notes the condition of the infrastructure and lack of supplies. Once again the sparkof a future trade minster ignites. The meeting with Lenin and his detailed report of activities of the Baku Communists was the defining moment in Mikoyan’s rise to a position of power. Lenin must have wrote off an easy victory in the region or even given up seizing oilrich Baku. The last orders given were to adjust as necessary and Mikoyan had done just that. The leadership Anastas displayed in reviving the revolutionary movement was by no means a lesson dictatorial politics. The Baku Soviet Workers Council was a highly democratic organization and within this group Mikoyan brilliantly debated his proposals that ensured its survival. This preconference meeting gained Lenin’s confidence assuring a future role for Anastas in high level Soviet politics. This was not only a time for recognition for his dedicated party work but at the conference a decision will be made to complete his previous efforts in Baku. A major obstacle in Azerbaijan region involved the muslim communist organizations, the Adelet and Gummet, would not align under the Bolshevik party banner. Mikoyan discovered their respective leaders attended the conference and promised Lenin that they would honor Soviet power once instated . Following the conference, Mikoyan journeyed south to join up with the XI Red Army to assault Baku.₇

This assault is notable for two reasons, it demonstrates the importance of trains (especially armored ones) in taming the geographic realm of Russia and to give credit for the 20th century’s first blitzzugkrieg raid.₈ In retrospect the use armored trains seems archaic but at the time as a tactical assault vehicle it was unmatched. The goal was to seize the Baku oil facilities before they could be destroyed. The plan was an attack on April 26th by the XI Red Army and Communist underground military cells stationed in Baku. In an incredible maneuver the armored trains travel down the coast of the Caspian Sea using cavalry units to guard the right flank with infantry units flooding forward seizing territory.₉ Mikoyan in the final push displays his genius. Nearing the Azerbaijan border, the Red Army stops while Mikoyan and a few officers openly walk over the connecting railroad bridge early in the evening. They objective is to check for mines along the track and calculate the enemies preparedness and strength. They joyfully greet the enemy guards and engage in small talk, even joining in song and dance. They release how unprepared they are for an assault and return. At midnight they strike seizing the crossing, then station after station, calling ahead to the speak to the retreating enemy commander requesting he come over to their side. The advance goes so smoothly within a day they are outside of Baku. Remarkably they are asked to withdraw as they are too far out in front of the supporting troops. Mikoyan informs them it would be more dangerous to return and they wait on the outskirts of the city. Inside Baku word of the XI Red Army on the doorstep resulted in instantaneous collapse and disappearance of the government officials. Militant Communist units seized the oil facilities and government building so quickly it was said the police were still patrolling the streets unaware of the change in power. As he proclaimed the previous May Day that Soviet power would return in a year and so it did.

Within a period of five years Anastas Mikoyan went from a activist student to Communist leader during the First World War. His intention of writing these memoirs was to inspire future youthful generations. Unfortunately he completed only one of several planned books but that which he had described, documented, and commented on in extraordinary detail brings to life the men and women involved. Understanding a revolution’s early intention of changing nation should be more than inspirational, it should be a warning that the dangers are not the revolution itself but the power struggle involved in its wake. The studies of Communist operational methodology may seem irrelevant in the post Cold War Era. The Bolshevik battle cry “by any means necessary” in obtaining inevitable goals by legal and subversive tactics may have faded in the minds of victors of the 20th Century’s ideological war. However two current events seemingly unrelated may be theoretically be joined based on past Communist thinking. Red China’s President Hu recent visit to the USA aimed at economic ties with Americanbased corporate giants Boeing and Microsoft gained more media attention than his visit with President Bush. Here we witness the above ground “play by the rules” strategy in the new world economic war.

American news media examined every move and phrase for signs of Red China’s intentions in dealing with economic problems between the two nations. Yet a very recent article slipped under the radar of national headlines and was posted in the Austin American Statesman on Monday 24th April 2006.₁₀ The breaching of personal information from the computer system located at the University of Texas at Austin’s McCombs School of Business of over 197,000 individuals.₁₁ The article mentions the hackers were based in the Far East and the university’s authorities refuse to give further details. If and when the source of the hackers is discovered and release, I predict with eighty percent certainty it will be from Red China. A link with the government may not be provable but examining past Communist successes, this two tier war of attrition against an enemy can not only be waged politically but also on a economic level. The West seems to have often misunderstood Communist intention. Recalling Khrushchev ‘s prediction of “burying” Capitalism was understood as a ranting military threat whereas in reality it warned of an approach of a superior economic system. Final resolution on which system he referred may be coming into the view.

1 Armenian surnames commonly end in ian or an, which translates as “from the the tribe of”.

2 This ancient mine originally developed by the Persians, was currently owned by a French jointstock company.

3 The use and teaching of the Armenian language was banned in educational institutions during Czarist Rule.

4 The petition from 16 July 1916 still exists. During Mikoyan’s years there, no graduates entered the clergy.

5 Favorites topics included the French Revolution, the Roman Empire, and Chernyshevsky’s “What is to be done”.

6 See map on page18 to understand the dire situation Lenin describes.

7 This force was composed of 72,000 men, including calvary units and three armored trains. The opposition’s force number were half of this.

8 A play on the German word blitzkrieg, inserting zug (train) gives us “lightning train war”.

9 See page 17 for a map displaying the tactics.

10 “UT Breach: 200,000 put at risk of ID theft.” AustinAmerican Statesman, 24 April 2006 sec. A, p.1

11 Data included the names, birth dates, and social security numbers of alumni, faculty, staff, current and
prospective students and corporate recruiters.

BIBLIOGRAPHY – Anastas Mikoyan

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

Ellison, Herbert J. and Donald W. Treadgold. Twentieth Century Russia. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000

Hoffman, William. Polish Surnames: Origins and Meanings. Chicago, Illinois: Polish Genealogical Society of America, 1996.

Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich. Memoirs of Anastas Mikoyan The path of struggle. Madison, Connecticut: Sphinx Press, 1988.

Stalin, Joseph V.. “The Shooting of the Twenty Six Baku Comrades by Agents of British Imperialism”. Izvestia, 23 April 1919. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1919/04/23.htm#b1. (6 March 2006)

Document Analysis: Graffiti

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The graffiti preserved from Pompeii, Italy (79 BCE) gives the impression of highly civilized and successful society very similar to our own. One may tend to believe after reading these scribbled verses that youth are all same even across the centuries. However I suppose that the mischievous young scribes are a byproduct of a successful culture in the sense that not only is the general public educated enough to write, society in turn tolerates it. If Roman Society at this time was extremely harsh and severe penalties were applied to the populace for infractions
to enforce submission to authority then we would not have these records. Seeing how graffiti was tolerated by its abundance and variety, may we suppose their legal system had a sense of fairness applying justice so the punishment matched the crime?

Thinking about family relationships one notices that arranged marriages may not have been the order of the day and courting was going on between the sexes though maybe not so successfully. Comparing a court or military historian’s record from this time would probably not have the emotion as stated in these verses. Can we assume that relationships between citizens were valued more than their relationship to the State? Personally I get the impression the Roman Empire is at its peak culturally as the graffiti is only concerned with daily lives and self centered concerns, no mention of great conquests or politics on empire’s edge.

Graffiti tells us to what degree a society is open in relation to economic structure, personal relations, political culture, and moral limits. It tells us that the pen is mightier than the sword but only in times of peace and prosperity.

Borodin: Stalin’s Man in China

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

Today China, Europe, Russia, and the United States compete in a global market economy, few remember just a few decades, the world was very different place. Popular history seems only to note events that changed the world. Political Science glorifies those that made an impact or were devoured in man’s march through time. However, a better understanding of the world today can be had by studying those who surrounded the decision makers and executed their orders. Dan J. Jacobs’ Borodin: Stalin’s Man in China is a fascinating account of the second level of historical players and their mark on history. This in depth biography of a man covered by the historical sands of time covers three often narrowly detailed topics: The Communist International- operations and methods, the original seeds of the Sino-Soviet Split, and the chaos of Chinese politics during the power struggle from Sun Yat-sen to Chiang Kai-shek. The 20th Century is viewed as the passing of power from a Euro-centric world to the United States. The possibility of either resource abundant Russian Federation or labor behemoth People’s Republic of China, making the 21st Century their own, places added value into this dynamic book based on Jacob’s intensive research. Michail Borodin (Михаил Вородин), born a Jew as Mikhail Markovich Gruzenberg in 1884, in Belarus which was then under the control of Czarist Russia. Though obscure records exists, Jacobs has pieced together the early life of a man who often refused to speak in detail of this roots. Borodin attended Russian schools and became fluent in Russian. 19th Century shtetl life the Pale for 4 million Jews was a difficult, so as young man he moved to Lithuania.1 He worked as river boat smuggler picking of the Latvian language. Joining Jewish political organization discontent with Nicolas II, he also worked as courier on his smuggling routes. His foray into politics eventually brought contact with factions of the Bolshevik Party. Michael Borodin attended many of the famed early 20th Century social democratic congresses throughout Europe. When the Bolsheviks split away, he followed Lenin. At many of the meetings he sat next to Joseph Stalin, starting a lifelong relationship. Records Jacobs uncovered indicated Borodin more often voted with inline with Stalin than Lenin. Throughout this time his skills at smuggling and languages placed him in the position as a dependable courier. As events unfolded in 1905 and Czar Nicolas II gave in to political concessions, Borodin and many other activists returned to Russia. However, soon after the reactionary programs by Pytor Stolypin, head of the Czar’s council of ministers, forced many Bolsheviks into exile. Borodin chose to emigrate to the United States and the hopes of overthrowing autocratic rule faded away. Starting in a new life in America proved fairly easy for him. Landing in Boston and eventually heading to Chicago, he went from job to job until starting an English language school for immigrants. Using both Russian and Jewish contacts, Borodin became a community leader in local politics and had a very successful small business. He often socialized at the Hull House with Jane Adams. Here he would receive news on the events taking place back in Russia. He often commented how American socialism toyed with revolutionary change and was more concerned with the rights of the underprivileged. The October Russian Revolution of 1917 complicated his life. Now with a wife and two children, he was called back to Russia by Lenin. As an English speaker and Lenin’s only eyes to the events of socialism’s progress in America, Borodin was highly valued back in Moscow. Leaving his family behind was one problem, the other a bourgeoisie past would be a skeleton in his communist closet. His talks with Lenin and the need to spread revolutionary socialism to the Americas placed him in a position as a Communist International (Comintern) agent. His life would soon be filled with international intrigue. From 1919 until 1992, often under alias, he traveled throughout the USA, Mexico, and Caribbean searching out new recruits for the communist cause. He became the Soviet’s first super-spy and wanted by authorities worldwide. In an era lacking technologically advanced communication, a game of cat and mouse developed. Becoming the free world’s main fugitive, every port around the world was on the look out for Borodin. His methods of traveling and funding communist movements are some of the highlights of the biography. The two notable incidents involved two suitcases lined with Czarists diamonds and recruiting Indian National Manabendra N. Roy into the Kremlin ‘s fold.2 Funding of the Comintern overseas was difficult in 1020’s. Not for lack of funds, but rather transporting. On one journey, Borodin and a companion traveled back to the USA via a Caribbean port and when authorities began a search for suspected Bolsheviks. He handed off the suitcases with hidden diamonds to his companion, who was unaware of the contents, scribbled his wifes address in Chicago, and proceeded to jump ship. Eventually Borodin arrived safely in Chicago, the companion or suitcases did not. Such an occurrence created great suspicion in the Kremlin and as the years past by. The next tale of intrigue was fulfilling orders while in Chicago to recruit persons with anti-American in Mexico. Traveling under an alias as usual, he mingled with the affluent liberal thinkers in Mexico City. Making the acquaintance of Manabendra N. Roy, Borodin won him over to the Bolshevik cause It not by ideological arguments but rather is displaying of class and a lavish lifestyle. Borodin was acting but Roy took the bait. Eventually this convert would be invited to meet with Lenin, create Communist parties in Mexico and India, and eventually team up with Ho Chi Minh. The first third of his life was filed with heroic tales in support of the Bolshevik cause. Lenin called him back to Russia in 1922, and with the diamond fiasco still hanging over him, he returned to Moscow a celebrity. With the Communist push into Western Europe at the point of stagnation, Lenin sent him off to the far east, to influence the Kuomintang (KMT) in their cause to unify and expel imperialistic forces. Miraculously at this time, his wife informed him the diamonds had arrived at his home in Chicago, saving him from an uncertain future. The importance of this biography is the attention to details covering the relationship between Comintern, Chinese Communist party, and KMT. Often history books too often skim over these events in Chinese history. However, this book details the absolute chaos and unpredictability of the various factions struggling to control China. With no power strong enough to dominate, the politics in 1920’s China is difficult to comprehend. Jacob’s lays out events along with personal details and behavioral aspects of all the major players involved. Moscow’s assistance to the KMT’s struggle was not without resistance. The Bolsheviks were the only source for military assistance, yet Sun Yat-sen danced with the Kremlin but always called the tune. The price for assistance was allowing Borodin to coordinate the structure of KMT that allowed incorporation of the CCP. However, the majority of financial supporters were upper middle class Chinese who had the most to loose under a socialist system placing Sun Yat-sen in a difficult position. Additionally, controlling the peasant masses even he made any concessions would only lead to further reforms. Sun Yat-sen openly used Borodin as an advisor to please the Kremlin but never gave in to his list of demands. The experienced master spy and manipulator that he was, eventually became a close confidante. Sun Yat-sen made no real concessions until the KMT close to destruction. Borodin rallied the KMT forces at a time when all was nearly lost. His abilities at organization was turning point in which Sun Yat-sen opened up to reforms in the KMT. The military academy at Whampoa is listed as a major accomplishment in Bolshevik and KMT cooperation, Jacob’s details its formation and the subtle methods the communists used to infiltrate its ranks. An important fact discussed is the early history of CCP reaching out to the peasant masses and Moscow’s directives to Borodin to ignore organizing them. The split in ideology on how to conquer China and the eventual communist rivalry was due to this Kremlin decision. Throughout the biography, little attention is paid to Mao Zedong and his early career. Major events such as the Northern Expedition, Communist base in Wuhan, and the destruction of the CCP in Shanghai by Chiang Kai-shek are discussed thoroughly. The Northern Expedition to unite China commenced in disregard of Borodin’s recommendation to wait until the KMT was stronger. Knowing it was inevitable, Borodin devised a plan the KMT accepted. Once on the march, Chiang Kai-shek however, changed the Borodin’s strategy and split his attacking forces. Suffering heavy losses, often to communist influenced units, won the objectives which raised his status in the KMT. After the victories, Borodin moved his headquarters to Wuhan. It then became the “Paris Commune” of Asia and reporters from all over the world flocked to see it. The tea parlor Borodin visited were filled with liberal reporter, and his international fame grew. Strangely, the stories told were far from reality in Wuhan. Reforms and socialist activities alarmed the foreign powers controlling the coast. In retaliation, they closed off Wuhan to the outside world, slowly decaying the city’s economy of this communist stronghold. Around the same time Wuhan was disintegrating into economic chaos, Chiang Kai-shek was marching on Shanghai. In what was supposed to be coordinated attack by communist forces and workers on the inside and the KMT from the outside, became a political power play by Chiang. History often ignores the fact the CCP took the city but was then weeded out and executed by KMT forces. Chiang then turned the weakened communist base in Wuhan. As the KMT approached, Borodin’s last hope was assistance by Warlord Feng Yuxiang. In a turning point in Chinese history, Feng balked, and Borodin and Moscow’s aspirations were forced to flee China. During all these events, Stalin was struggling for supreme power back in Moscow after Lenin’s death. Stalin failure in having backed a policy uniting with the KMT rather than the masses, made Chiang Kai-shek betrayal a major politic mishap. Borodin often commented how Stalin was out of touch with the situation reality and the orders from Moscow were often unrealistic. Somehow Borodin escaped being made a scapegoat upon. Maybe it was his friendship with Stalin during the early party days as Stalin had a penchant for removing the old guard Bolsheviks from the face of the earth. Borodin as witness to the failure, was of further use in help Stalin weave a tale to get out of the mess. The trek back Moscow after the fiasco is an amazing tale in itself. Suffering from malaria and dysentery with his broken arm in a cast, Borodin and the remaining Bolsheviks drove across the Gobi desserts to safety in Mongolia. This was the only time he suffered a lapse as a good Bolshevik, openly commenting how the Russian mechanic and drivers were an awful disorganized and worthless lot. During many of their breakdowns he spoke of how wonderful American vehicles were and how the Capitalists superbly maintained them. One gets the impression from this and further statements comparing the systems, the years in Chicago were the happiest of his life. It is worth noting that throughout his Chinese adventure he was accompanied by his wife and two sons. The entire attempt was done on a with no real knowledge of Chin and blindly following orders based on ideology not reality. Somehow Borodin made amazing headway into the KMT, though every advance was undone by the wavering alliances of Chinese chieftain politics. Having rubbed shoulders with the major political figures of Communism in the 20th century, his fame and career quickly faded. He became reclusive and given token employment by Stalin as an editor. From Comintern hero to obscurity, Stalin eventually shipped him off to a gulag in 1949 were died 2 year after. Fortunately, his good name was reinstated after Stalin’s death but he still remains in the shadows of history, somehow appropriate for a Comintern agent. More than just a spy thriller, Jacob’s work gives valuable information for anyone trying understand current Chinese politics and how political power sharing is often influenced by alliances of opportune convenience.

Franklin D. Roosevelt – Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The career of Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) as a politician can best be described as a master craftsman. First impression may be to imagine of a confident individual operating a small shop coordinating both daily affairs and long term planning . This simple analogy is only a slice of a master craftsman for he must produce goods that are in demand or be wise enough to create demand. For without a sale the craft is wasted, and the item for sale was the New Deal. The balance of tensions working towards new solutions in demands from the voices of liberty and equality became Roosevelt’s trademark. This new shop faced a political “market” of conservative forces, a once successful Herbert Hoover and his philosophy as the main competition. Challenges came from those who demanded liberty and / or equality yet were defining them differently from their side of the economic heap. Analyzing some of the documents collected by Richard Polenberg, examples can be extracted showing how Roosevelt kept open the doors of his shop to new ideas and criticism though dangerously on the verge of a democratic society’s institutional bankruptcy. In a morally conservative America changing this system without losing support from those who backed his power and those who needed its application was the the issue he had to address. Before Roosevelt’s political skill can be understood, we must look at the environment of the democratic market he was in. The gospel of Hoover viewed liberty in simple absolute legal terms Freedom from restraint. Therefore any attempt to chip or chisel away at liberty meant it would eventually collapse.

The Challenge to Liberty document displays his belief in the absolute perfection of our American ideals in resolving current conditions. (p.114) His steadfastness in republican thought of top down economics can only see liberty’s soul in its spiritual sense leaving the body in want. He comments that FDR’s proposals will “lead definitely from the path to liberty” and once this is taken any additional powers given to the President will spiral into tyrannical hunger for more. (p.115) In his cry for governmental policy based status quo of our political heritage in a system of checks in balances, he warns there can be no part democracy and part tyranny. Hoover does not blindly desire to live in the past. Rather in his speech he acknowledges our technological and cultural growth as a nation as it applies to liberty like our crowded highways with the invention of traffic signals that apply to everyone equally. (p.116) However if a policeman controls the intersection and tells you which way to go that is regimentation and in this position of authority he has the final decision of who goes when and where. He therefore swings the door of his shop wide open for all to enter and consume his brand of conservative theology. Unfortunately he doesn’t bother to look in the nation’s streets to see the condition of the populace. If you can make through the portals of his America, you are capable of surviving.

Any efforts to forcibly change the system will in his words, “undermine the stimulants to individual efforts.”. I summarize his statements to imply the American system has enough designed into it to solve all our difficulties, any reform will will begin erosion that will bring the system down. This Hooverian Liberty is best defined by the words of Ambrose Byrce’s Devil’s Dictionary as “One of Imagination’s most precious possessions.”. To these charges a balancing act was needed by FDR to justify traveling the road between liberty and equality. Unlike the Hooverites, he obtained support based on relationships with people not on ideology. This appeal to the nation started on the bottom of the oppressed economic scale. FDR confronted the issue of the equality over Hooverian Liberty from two sides, in equal sharing the burden and opening of opportunities, when he stated “we now realize our interdependence on one another”. (p.42) If the forgotten man falls, we all fall. In his First inaugural address swift action is called for to restore America and basing this on the recent past, it is only obtainable by government reform. The failures that paralyzed America were not of the peoples’ doing, he blames the demise of the system on the greedy selfinterested money changers in the temple of the economy. (p.41) A call goes out in his speech to let the people know that they have democratically spoken and as the chosen one he will act decisively be it with Congress or without.

Liberty in his words walks hand in hand with the sacred obligation of government to assist its citizens in such a dire hour. He points out much can be accomplished through more organization between local, state, and federal authorities as the evil doers of the past have failed and abdicated in its association with government. His first priority is to get the “national house” in order and closes emphasizing that the Constitution is so simply designed that its flexibility can meet the nation’s needs of today as it has served in the past. (p.41,42) Can this be an encroachment on liberty? He points out an effort will be made to work within the law but may if an emergency arises, will ask for special executive powers. This is all based on the people’s trust in him and this mandate to act will not be morally abused. This gave him some confidence to wade into the waters challenging traditional conservative liberalism. FDR in this speech seems to portray a sense of faith in himself and in the American people to face the crisis but says little about the exact road he will lead down. Without stating the exact platform it gives him the opportunity to adjust and react as required. If the equality of shared burden and trust of the nation to revive the nation is a prerequisite then will the result uplift the previously down trodden in American society?

Forces within his administration and most notably his wife, Eleanor, assuredly reminded him of this need. Roosevelt had to as shopkeeper listen to the advice and decide how to apply it. This is where tensions arise due to so many voices and choices in the White House’s inner circle and outside opposition. We must not however use our era’s definition of equality under the law as vantage point. In that era the government had not regulated nor enforced what we accept for equality both socially and economically. Any move towards favoring the rich and/ or minorities would at this time be met with opposition as governmental tyranny. The New Deal involved constitutionally challenging programs and the need for presenting them under the the banner of a united national house in order must have been difficult. There was enough backlash from the defenders of liberty against his attempts at economic recovery through federal government intervention let alone to disrupt the moral ideals of the day losing important Congressional allies.

The true battle he faced in is addressing this dilemma may have come from the relationship with his activist wife, Eleanor. FDR considered the morals of the majority of Americans as to sustain support, Eleanor however challenged those values throughout his presidency. Two of Eleanor Roosevelt’s documents show how the fine line was crossed giving ammunition to the president’s critics. First on the role of women in their respective traditional roles and in the inequality of minorities. The timing of these documents is critical and I am sure caused much debate between the first couple. Had the documents been chronologically reversed, the resultant uproar would have critically undermined FDR’s support. In 1938 with the economy still stagnant, Eleanor’s first document Women in the Labor Force. (p.93) states a rational case for women equally immersed in the shadow of the Great Depression. Early in his presidency the relationship between the two must have been very intense and realistic.

Franklin needing devotedsupport from her under the stress of office yet her insight probably persuaded him to allow her public support for women, children, immigrants, and racial minorities. Allowing Eleanor to address the women’s view was a brilliant tactic. It enabled to display that Washington was concerned for this slice of society giving additional popular support to FDR yet any backlash would be direct at his wife. In moving along this path, FDR must have addressed exactly how far and when his wife could challenge conservative America. Her efforts brought much attention to those opposing her husband’s policies but I view this as a collaboration between them as not a solution to those problems but as a beacon of hope that the forgotten could look upon. The need for a grass roots mobilization to move the nation forward was fought on two fronts, Franklin calling on the traditional moral values of Americans in a time of crisis, and Eleanor using her intelligence and sensibility to address the realities of American life was critical in the administrations survival.

Eleanor Roosevelt’s Women in the Labor Force is a no nonsense approach that women are also members of our society. The tradition of the times with a woman’s role as dedicated to a family at home is challenged by arguments are that they take scarce jobs away that men need as heads of households. Eleanor argues women working is not just for money but for dignity and involvement in the community. She believes it is not about morals whether a woman has a right to work but necessity and most importantly that issue is for her to decide in the balance between work and home responsibilities. Later with the nations of the world being engulfed in war, Eleanor on the 11th of May 1942 writes Race, Religion and Prejudice.(p.224) This document diverts away from the common sense reality based arguments she makes during the heart of the depression to an idealogical one. Action by the federal government on the issues of minorities would not take place for another 20 years and I am surprised to why she would deter from her candid approach to minority issues and bring these issues to the spotlight while the nation was on a precarious path to war. Previously she was the voice of the minorities within our nation’s border during time of economic crisis not in a world ideological view.

I have the notion it FDR had much to do with which issues and how far she could go in challenging the them. In view of our own discrimination against Jews, AfricanAmerican, Chinese, and LatinoAmericans, Eleanor recalls her vigilant efforts to undo the hippocratic nature of American society now that we are faced with totalitarian regimes that apply a similar racial philosophy. This echoes of Woodrow Wilson’s call to action and support of the Progressives in the previous World War. In retrospect her call for action at home for change on the verge of a world crisis will not be answered and leave these groups unfulfilled in the immediate postwar period. Was this in defiance of FDR caution in regards in not upsetting the state of America’s race relations? FDR in my opinion should have held her back in this call until after the war as the hubris of victory erased the memory of prewar injustices and contributions of minorities in the war effort. FDR’s battle for reform was placed before a suffering American people and presented in terms of biblical morality in the need to revive through governmentally applied reforms. Unfortunately his push on the Constitution and action against the heritage of conservative Liberty was not successful in resolving the Depression. The attempt to place the hand of the federal government into the everyday lives of the nation failed as did the laissezfaire policies of Herbert Hoover.

The goal of uniting a nation towards an equitable economic prosperity came with mobilization for World War II. Depression Era macroeconomic policies were a trial and error attempt at new ways for temporary government action that did not restore the economy yet barely saved the system. The overwhelming use of federal government’s command and control of the economy brought the nation up off its knees. When FDR stated there was nothing to fear but fear itself, he probably was terrified into what reaction his policies would go whether successful or not. Indecisiveness must be a dominant gene in a politician for it took winning a world war for FDR to have the bold confidence to speak of an economic Bill of Rights in his 1944 State of the Union Address.(p.226) When I think about his statement, “We have come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and dependence”, he is clearly stating something he now believes. (p.227) His previous encroachment on liberty was now justified as it turned the country away from turmoil and possible dictatorship. The success of instituting the federal government as an active member of American society was not in how he addressed the problems through new policies while addressing the need for support. It was the use of experimentation, political juggling, and finally what I interpret as lucky timing in what
was to the start of our long standing federal governmental policies.

Russia – Viet Nam Foreign Policy

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

Russia, as the largest geographic state on the planet, remains one of the least understood. Centuries of international politics have not eroded Russia’s territorial size or its even larger enigma to the outside world. Generation after generation of politicians dealing with Moscow have misinterpreted Russian foreign policy. Western nations battled against Moscow, seeing the Russian state as a reflection of their own European
image or cursed this Slavic horde as an Asiatic barbarian. To the South and East tensions were less yet the idea as the Russian being barbaric continued. This geographic position has had many consequences affecting the development of the Russian state. One foot in the West’s cultural influences and the other planted firmly on Eastern political ideologies continually distracts internal development of the society.₁ Today in a multi-polar world, the challenge of understanding the Russian double-headed eagle again arises as increased nationalism and a growing economic power based on oil and gas revenues again project it onto the world stage. Current world leaders that previously opposed Soviet Union, now have to contend with the new Russian Federation that has arisen from the communist rubble.₂ Today the Kremlin is promoting its new thinking, a theme of cooperation on peace, security, and economic issues which commenced under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev.₃

A visible contrast against Putin’s current consolidation of power on the domestic front.₄ Is it important today to examine Russian operational methods in a far off corner of the Asian continent and the possible consequences? The last century’s super power global competition was filed with irrational moves and self-centered ambitions. One previous American foreign policy gamble predicting the Soviet Union’s intentions, as per
President Dwight Eisenhower’s domino theory of communism’s advance, were summarized and stated bluntly by Robert McNamara, “We were wrong.”₅ Foreign policy making that results in the most tragic of outcomes, are made by those believing they are the self-righteous actors. The leadership in Moscow is pragmatic, manipulative, and realist. There are two dominant theories which influence Russian behavior in foreign
affairs. Firstly, it is the pressures applied from forces outside Russian borders which assigns a role as a reactionary player in international politics.₆ In support of this, centuries of Russia rejecting outside ideas, absolute paranoia towards aggression against its sovereign territory, and animosity towards its style of governance, places Russia in the role of a victim with little control of its destiny. The second theory counter to this, is the inherent characteristic of the Russian state are the controlling factor its behavior with engage with the outside world. The soul of Russia has two cardinal sins that only self-baptismal efforts can erase. The lack of moral counterbalance to guide its authoritarian nature, converts into simultaneous actions in overt and covert policies.

Additionally, the societal structure stunts the development of the individual, removing creativity, innovation, and motivation from Russia’s ability to cure the cancer of authoritarianism. The memory of the Soviet Union’s support for of an aggressive Vietnam, and a multitude of other Marxist satellite states, seems to have faded.7 Now that new themes have been introduced on old interests in Southeast Asia, Vladimir Putin has modified foreign policy and is entertaining the region as whole. Russia’s generous offerings from a far off land are welcomed change from the threat of ideological subversion the Communists introduced. Current concerns are based China’s growing economic interests across the South China Sea. Such new policies ride on the back of Russia newest propaganda weapon for infiltration, trade and security issues. Power is no longer injected by military might but rather by the influx of capital. Russia’s current policies will demonstrate that past goals (and methods) have been revived. World politics have changed with the conclusion of bi-polar ideological competition morphing into multiple regions of power. Once defined as spheres of influence, these new center can now be defined as spheres of cooperation. Modern powerful nations can no longer pick off states one by one and need to cooperate with these newly rising regions which have grown mainly from the the post-colonial areas of domination.

Starting in 1967, five Southeast Asia nations formed into a sphere of common interest, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) .₈ Once individual targets of influence by the more powerful states, the current 10 member association is more able to stand on its own and represents a population of 560 million. The justification for analyzing Russian foreign policy in the region is two fold. Firstly and most importantly, is the need to secure human development in the region along guidelines the people of the region can determine on their own without outside detrimental disturbances. Secondly, in learning from present and past mistakes, as well as the successes in the region, any foreign policy instigated in the region must not be a reactionary counter measure to Russian moves. What should be taken into consideration is in the general interest of the long term needs of the region as it fits into the mosaic of the entire world. Foreign policy decisions focusing along these guidelines has less of a chance of creating tragic consequences that have set back the United States in moral and political terms. Vladimir Putin’s united Russian Federation newly polished image as cooperative member of multi-polar world is actively courting ASEAN under a mutual respect and common interests. Once hoping to dominant the region as an ideological master, today finds Russian foreign policy advancing into the ASEAN sphere, assuming the role as a negotiator, trading and security partner.

By again nurturing its relationship with Hanoi, it is reestablishing its foothold in Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), which it is using as a crucial pivot point for the region. By examining the interactions there, a model for its behavior throughout ASEAN can be determined. Moscow’s justifying theme is based on the claim it is an Asiatic power, endowing it with the natural right to be involved in the area.₉ One could argue that there are many other regions Russia could be willing to push for intense cooperation with on security and economic issues. Other regions have potential as developmental partners such as Latin America via struggling Cuba, Eastern Europe using the corrupt Slovak Republic, and the Central Asia southward entertaining Iran. Old habits die hard, especially in Russian behavior. The Kremlin’s past massive financial drains supporting ideological intentions were mistakes that would be wise not to repeat. The region is still inherently undeveloped and Russian may have the financial resources but not the exportable development assistance to strengthen the regions enough to become worthwhile investments. The same could be said for the Middle East and Africa, as they would require too much investment of financial capital and provide unsure political gains and financial rewards. Central Asia , where Russia once ad a historical Imperialistic thrust to be a dominant power, finds Russia more as a negotiator. The region may not have economic advantages but there are inherent political advantages of having domination is the region along Russia soft Islamic underbelly. Eastern Europe has drifted slowly into the European Union’s camp economically and militarily, though the political leadership tends to lean towards autocracy. The attractiveness for reestablishing a relationship with Vietnam is more than just its geographic location as center of ASEAN market. A traditional enemy of Red China, Vietnam, is also a strategic flanking position.₁₀ The history of contested border areas in under development of Siberia is an area on Russo-Sino contention. The strengthening of Vietnam is a practical countermeasure towards Moscow’s third ranked advisory.₁₁ Additionally, the long standing lack of a warm deep water port for the Russian Navy, optimizes Vietnam (or the entire region) as a potential forward base station. Russia and the United States near the end of the 20th century had lost their respective gains there, the Kremlin’s experience was less damaging. Vietnam is seen as a model of success amongst its neighbors, a once war torn society that rebuilt itself without being heavily dependent on foreign aid or intervention. Needing to continue this economic growth, Russian cooperation is a viable solution. Strengthening these ties gives Russia an additional advantage, the SRV has influence over impotent Laos and corrupt Cambodia. These two states are traditional enemies of a United State’s ally, Thailand, therefore promotes countering both American and Chinese domination in the region which was attempted tragically in the past. Problems did occur in previous cooperation between Hanoi and Moscow. Though a patronizing ally and ideological brother, the the former Soviet Union could not fully control the SRV’s behavior. The Kremlin directed foreign assistance in mega-projects, such as factories, mining, and power generation stations, but often Vietnamese corruption
squandered the funds. Moscow’s complaints about this were responded by Hanoi’s accusation of the inferiority of Russian engineering. Additional tensions occurred when the former Soviet Union funded the expensive Clausewitz-influenced foreign policies as Hanoi decided to invade and occupy Cambodia in 1978. Today we find the ASEAN region and international community keeping a leash on Vietnamese aggression, only
because the former pariah’s needs have changed in maintaining survival of the ruling communist party. Even though the Soviet Union had to coldly drop the Socialist Republic of Vietnam as a dependent Marxist ally (economic dependent) when it dissolved, the past relationship was a strategic ideological success. The one party system installed is still in power, still anti-Chinese, and desiring to be an economic tiger. So in searching for developmental partners, the cash loaded Russian comrades are an obvious choice. No longer having the price of a dowry as a dependent Marxist state, Hanoi is in a better position to negotiate in dealing with Moscow, and has more to offer in return.₁₂ A counter argument would be that by once again associating with the peninsula’s historic aggressor, the other AEAN member States may be find this disturbing. The once labeled the political crocodile, Vietnam seems pacified and committed to cooperation with the international community. Admitted to ASEAN in 1995, the SRV assisted the other region’s poorer states, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar ascension into the group, gives evidence to this new spirit of cooperation (and influence with its weaker neighbors).13 Additionally, the SRV managed the ASEAN’s external relations with the Russian federation from 1997 until 2000. ASEAN may view the relationship between Hanoi and Moscow as an easier route to accelerate cooperation. Hanoi has a seat as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the 2008-09 term which also benefits current Russian propaganda of the importance of abiding by international law.14 Finally, SRV and Russia have a memorandum of understanding for Russian admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO).₁₅The Kremlin has many opportunities benefits rekindling this association.

Though Russia is overtly courting ASEAN, there are two poorer states where more covert actions can easily take place with Hanoi’s assistance. Their UNDP 2008 Human Development Index rankings (out of 178 listed) for Laos is 130th and Cambodia 131st, make them more susceptible to corruption₁₆. Vietnamese governmental influence in these two states can manipulate advantageous agreements for Russian penetration. One would expect Russia, who has been of late a prominent vocal supporter of international law and the legitimacy of the United Nations authority, would cooperate in helping these states along similar tactics of other UN members. A outwardly sincere Russian Federation has no major Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) operating in the region nor supplying direct non-conditional foreign aid. Typically action without governmental bureaucratic oversight is an inherent characteristic of Russia and frowned upon by the Kremlin. This control is evident even on the domestic front, NGOs, considered fifth columns, have been heavily regulated by recent Duma legislations within the Russian Federation.₁₇

Oddly, Moscow’s use of NGOs is for political purposes and have set up watchdog groups to monitor the democratic process in New York and Paris in attempt to report discrepancies in the systems.18 The preferred method of cooperation is between one autocratic government to another adding to attractiveness of dealing with the ASEAN states. Rather than focusing on issues of human development using all their societies’ resources, any policy actions are designed to increase the power and legitimacy of the center. The Russian model of governance has seen little changed in the past few centuries. Economic adventures are not the only methods of increasing Russian involvement in Vietnam. Though Vietnamese legislators makes statements for increased Russian investment, Moscow is promoting programs of cultural cooperation.₁₉

One would expect this to promote a better understanding of cultures but as always serves a underlining purpose. Inter-cultural cooperation is mainly in the area of education using scholarships that focus on promoting the Russian language. The deep folk traditions, literary and musical aspects of both nations are overlooked as Vietnamese students sent to Moscow for solely language training is a method of self-promotion and attempts strengthen the alignment. During the Vietnamese war for liberation, Russia may have preached international communist brotherhood but in reality acted differently as would any hegemon. The Soviet military trainers sent to assist the Vietnamese Air Force spoke no Vietnamese, resulting in a pilot candidates needing to receive a minimum of 9 months intensive Russian language courses before any training could begin. The Russians do not seem interested in doing nything difficult unless of course it is done their way.20 Last year to celebrate this historic partnership, a gathering of the Vietnam-Russia Friendship Association at Hanoi University commemorated the 63rd anniversary of the victory over fascism.21 An attendee, Dr. Ha Thanh Phong, who studied in Moscow during Soviet times, praised the event and the Russian cooperation in liberating Vietnam. However today, one finds him not as a university professor at a university, but working in the weaving Industry Institute at the Light Industry ministry. Lacking efficient light industries of its own and lost with the collapse of COMECON, it appears to an example of Russian centered policies- a Russian speaking Vietnamese official in an industry of Russian interest. Why the Russian do not send any Vietnamese speaking Russian experts into developing trade with these light industries or create their own points to the desire to take the easy route of cooperation.

The Russian Department at Hanoi University also promoted a Russian culture week, filled with talks and lectures by native Russian speakers. The event was void of any true cultural activities or topics in the arts, traditions, cuisines, and certainly not about the reemergence of the Russian Orthodox religion or growing xenophobic nationalism. The lack of true cultural exchanges, at the price of promoting governmental interests, will in the long run prove harmful. A proper cultural understanding, especially in dealing with Asiatic cultures, is extremely important. If one remembers, the stormy personal Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Ze Dong relationship and the Sino-soviet ideological split, the Russians (as well as the Americans) should be learning from such past mistakes.₂₂

A relationship lacking this component will eventually lead to misjudgment of intentions when any sort of disagreements do occur. Russia most likely intends to lock in to Vietnamese industries and manipulate the system to their advantage once this is accomplished. Once again exported Russian technical expertise to Vietnam is mainly in building large industrial projects such as factories, dams, a nuclear reactor, and of increasing
importance to the region, oil extraction technologies. The need for assistance in maintaining old Soviet military hardware in use in Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) 5000,000 member military force is also a priority. Putin plans to upgrade the SRV’s military capabilities, “Vietnam needs not just to maintain its existing weapons bought from the Soviet Union and Russia, but also needs modern weapons.”₂₃ The new image as new partner in security for the region sees nothing wrong with upgrading its old comrade’s offensive capabilities for the sake of profit. When former communist veterans from both nations reunite annually to celebrate the Vietnam’s fraternal liberation, rather than talks of the improvements since the war, they enjoy making outrages claims in past military superiority.₂₄

The old Marxists friends are working to eliminate visa requirements for their respective traveling citizens. Tourist destinations that cater to Russians keep them isolate in Potemkin-like seaside resorts and traveling in isolated groups into the interior to destinations and markets catering to Russian-speakers.₂₅ If one purchased a round-trip full economy ticket from Moscow to Hanoi on Aeroflot for a two week holiday to participate
in the Russo-Vietnamese cultural activities held in May, the price would be US$1,316.40. To the average Russian citizen it is a mere 23% of a yearly salary after taxes (42% in 2005) .₂₆ A total of 44,554 visited in 2007, mainly to predetermined villages expecting their arrival. Travelers from from SRV’s ex-enemies- Chinese 43,290 and the Americans 37,462 visitors, shows that there is no major influx of Russians eager to celebrate with this renewed old friend.₂₇ Similar plans for Russian-oriented tourism are currently in the works for the Kingdom of Cambodia. The consequences of which again competing with the Chinese and Americans there, could be a deterrent to solving the difficult issues faced by the Khmer nation today.

International cooperation is only on levels and issues that the Kremlin can have direct oversight and reap benefits. Russians traveling into the region are there to accomplish certain tasks or only experience certain things. Is Moscow still attempting to isolate its population from the corruptive forces outside its borders? The previous list of limited and calculated actions in cooperation definitely support this concept. If the
average Vietnamese or Russian citizen does becomes fascinated with the idea starting a small business in the other’s nations, are the obstacles unsurmountable? It takes 29 days to legally start a small business in Russia but you will be faced with a 30% tax on profits (residents pay a flat 13%). In Hanoi the time period increases to 50 but with a lower 21.5% tax rate. In the United States a meager 6 days is needed to accomplish this. Rather than a building up of an economic base from small foreign investments and individual based cooperation (and the ability not easily oversee the activities), these two partners have an obvious preference for control. The average Vietnamese and Russian citizen will receive no major benefits from this developing relationship between Russia and Vietnam as it is designed to strengthen the current hierarchies and promote the legitimacy of the ruling elites. There lacks clear examples Russo-Viet cooperation on a sincere humanitarian level. Though this overt partnership and the strengthening of old bonds is promoted under as a new spirit of cooperation, but in reality Russia’s real attitude and intentions towards
Vietnam is for self-serving interests.

Warm waters may supply an outlet thawing Russian tourists but the ancient almost desperate need for a seaport outside its frigid waters remains a high priority.²⁸ After the American withdrawal from Vietnam, the Soviet’s had a naval base temporarily at Cam Ran Bay, Vietnam.₂₉ Yearlong access to a repair and refueling station located in Southeast Asia has multiple benefits- counter balance to U.S. fleets in the region, intimidate Red China on its southern flank, and protect the contested oil reserves in the South China. Russian once stepped lightly in the region trying avoid having the national liberation wars escalate to a direct confrontation with the West.₃₀ As economic ties develop that are necessary for the the Russian economy, it is essential they secure a naval base. History has shown that the ability to project power and protect economic interests is
an essential element in becoming a hegemon. During the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union was at a great disadvantage without a secure deep water port in which import military hardware for Vietnamese usage. The Chinese provided a major barrier to transport with over territory flights being denied , or subjected to delays in overland rail transport as the Chinese dismantled and copied Soviet hardware.

In the battle against internal problems faced by Russia, Southeast Asia is declared as a point of origin for the development of radical terrorist groups and illegal drug production. A forward based military post combined with the legitimate right to cooperate on security issues by the invitation of ASEAN, may likely lead to a bolder Russian Federation. Finally, such a base would increase measures to keep Red China off
balance and eyes off Siberia. The Red China’s rise in power is highly dependent on trade with three-fourths of this traveling through the Strait of Malacca. A Russian Fleet located nearby would pose an apparent threat, similar to the U.S. Fifth Fleet watching the Middle East. Unfortunately one cannot predict the Beijing reaction to having the the Straits of Malacca become their Dardanelles. With a less than formidable naval force to counter Moscow, they would look upon a potent Russian Naval presence most unfavorably. As in all autocratic alliances, a dominant partner will naturally emerge. Vietnam is a much better position to negotiate with the Russians but as the economic bonds strengthen, will the tightening of the political noose follow? The 20th century relationship between the two was based on a superficial ideology only serving political
needs.31 The apparent Soviet assistance had a subversive element. The Kremlin had supplied military advisors and used Russian fishing trawlers of the coast in an apparent move to help Hanoi track the U.S. Navy. These intentions had an alternative purpose as the advisors tried to recruit VPA officers to work as agents for the Kremlin and the trawlers, while watching U.S. naval movements, at the same time were monitoring
Vietnamese military radio traffic. All under the banner of the international banner of fraternal Marxist solidarity. Deceptive moves will be easier if the Kremlin waves the UN flag.

The Russian, a notorious xenophobic and insecure people, most likely again try to nfiltrate their allies while simultaneously preaching cooperation. A perfect example of how easily the Kremlin applies the bait and switch tactic even to the best of proclaimed friends can be understood actions in the Duma. The Kremlin openly invites the Vietnamese to come to Moscow to start a business (rather than passing legislature to assist those going to Vietnam). But upon arrival and after a run of success things suddenly changed. Recently a popular Vietnamese owned retail market on the outskirts of Moscow that supported 500 immigrant families has been shut down. No compensation or assistance to them was provided after doing so. The Russian Duma decided to create a law forbidding the foreign ownership of retails outlets.32 Even after moves like this, Russia is surely promoting itself throughout ASEAN as a great place to do business. An enormous amount of immigrant workers also exist in the Russian federation, many from Vietnam.33 There they are doing the typical jobs most Russians refuse to do. These types of invitation can only persist while conditions are poor enough in Southeast Asia that people will take the risk.

Vietnam, for obvious reasons, is a opportune starting point for the Russian return to the into the region. Once under the facade of ideological goals as its raison d’être, Russia needs to return because what ASEAN has to offer is a key factor in overcoming domestic economic deficiencies that it is unable to resolve (or capable) on its own.₃₄ In the long run its foreign policy is just another traditional attempt at curing internal ills
growing from inherent longstanding weaknesses in Russia itself. Putin, having experienced the Soviet system, surely understands these weaknesses that undermined its domestic stability. The economic needs consist of not only a market for the heavy goods Russian produces but also for the light industrial (consumer goods) which have always been lacking in either desire to produce or ability. Russia’s traditional technological backwardness also needs a boost. For example, in 2006 the 53% of the United States population owned computers, in the Russian Federation a mere 4.5%. Access to low cost hi tech products could propel Russian society into the information age. Any advance may be modeled after the Red Chinese policy, the restricting Internet deemed not suitable for society. The more advanced states of ASEAN have already invested and developed expertise in electronics and communications (and the ability to trade). With capital to invest, natural resources to export, areas of expertise in heavy industries and military hardware, Russia and ASEAN are perfect bedfellows. Southeast Asia, once an ideological battle ground between capitalism and communism, has developed its potential on it own without damaging foreign political intervention. The member nations worked on stabilizing domestic conditions through genuine state building which in turn attracted outside foreign investment. Though slightly
autocratic in nature, ASEAN as a single unit has become a viable institution. It seems unlike the Russians would choose Vietnam as a pivot point to springboard into the region based upon the last foray into Southeast Asia that ended with them a supporting Vietnam in their immensely expensive invasion of Khmer Rouge controlled Cambodia.₃₅

However, today we find Russia being warmly accepted into ASEAN as a strategic partner.₃₆ Is this solely due to the role Russia can play as an energy and mineral supplier, leader in the development of heavy industries, and regional security partner, all current needs of the ASEAN Bloc?
Russia claims to be an Asiatic power but when defined as a state predisposed to despotic rule, the attraction to Southeast Asia becomes more apparent. Dissecting the 10 members of ASEAN, one finds the governments are not true Western style democratic republics. Four are governed with the influence of a monarchy or sultanate, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Three are one party states, Myanmar,
Vietnam, and Laos. The remaining three have traditional weakness, Philippines for corruption, Singapore for ease of money laundering, and Indonesia, where the state still monopolizes key sectors of the economy. Dominant ruling elites in control of a nation’s policy, as to per the Russian model, and the susceptibility to corruption, offer a fertile soil in which the Kremlin can sow the seeds of influence.

The Putin’s themes of cooperation Putin in response to what he calls the common concerns (three evils) shared by Russia and ASEAN- terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Putin justifies involvement stating that the roots of these three problems facing Russia originate throughout Southeast Asia. Promoting Russia’s experience at dealing with the three evils, he offers cooperation between security forces as a solution.
Russia had earlier called for the international community to deal with these issues but not until 911 did the world take heed which luckily validates his concerns. To combat terrorism, separatism, and extremism, Putin is offering Russia’s expertise to train ASEAN internal security forces in advanced tactics and techniques.₃₇ This is a clear warning sign. The last time the Russians were involved in this manner was when it insisted on controlling the Interior Ministries of the states under Red Army control following the defeat of Hitler. The promise of free elections never materialized as Stalin used the security forces to eliminate those opposed to his policies. The inherent corruption in Asiatic nations combined with the Russian’s pockets full of petrol-currency should be an easy avenue to corrupt the security forces’ leadership putting them as an invisible Kremlin force into the hearts of ASEAN. Additionally, one must remember they attempted this with VPA officers during the Vietnam conflict.
The miraculous economic success of the ASEAN region offers two mutually beneficial avenues for cooperation, energy and trade.₃₈ The ownership of the region’s current oil reserves in the South China Sea are being contested by the insatiable carbon consuming Red China. Putin has focused on the benefits as an alternative supplier to ASEAN’s growing needs should this source become unavailable. The thought of Europe
shivering through a cold winter with the Kremlin’s hand on the fuel supply valve should be considered by ASEAN members before dependency sets in.

Still stuck in the heavy industrial age, Russia has domestic needs for a dependable supplier of light industrial goods and advanced technologies. Rather than build the domestic institutions necessary to develop Russia creativity, competitiveness in modern fields, and increased stability at home, the choice has been made to obtain these from abroad. Under Gorbachev, they initially looked to the West to find solutions to domestic
problems and failed. As the entire ex-Soviet Eastern European bloc was absorbed by the European Union, the ASEAN states are an obvious choice for an alternative solution. Russia may on occasion bang its shoe for attention on the world stage, yet at the same time be capable of restraint in the most dire situations. The Soviet Union’s gains during the Cold war were only relinquished once the Communist party dissolved. The future is uncertain on how Russia would release any gains made in the 21st century. Will increased Russian political, economic, and military involvement prove disastrous? Many unforeseen circumstances await in any foreign policy forays in Southeast Asia. Even if the the border issues on Red China’s flanks remain calm, a crisis in oil or food production may upset the region. Two problems exist as Russia increases its exposure there. The Kremlin is void of any domestic restraints in opposition to its foreign policies, from
either a political force or popular voice emanating from the people. Additionally, without a moral compass and inexperience in solving true crises afflicting human development, its actions, as in the past, may be oppressive. The second problem is in ASEAN itself and its ability to stand up to a major crisis . Problems from tsunamis, rebel groups and disputes over oil reserves will seem minuscule should a major regional economic or military problem drop into ASEAN’s lap.

How they will react is anyone’s guess, but judging how autocracies usually react, self-preservation of the elite would become priority number one. Over the past 50 years military conflicts have had a better success rate of containment than economic crises. The 1998 collapse of the Thai baht sent waves large enough to cause a collapse of the Russian ruble. A declining U.S. economy, Red China’s over-rated economic strength, and the financial commitments of the European Union as it expands, may not leave a super power in place to assist a financial disaster originating in ASEAN. It is unlikely Moscow has the will or experience in leading the way. Further Russian involvement increases the probability of problems. Previously Soviet economic and military aid to Indochina was followed on its heels by the a successful group of gangsters, the Communist Party. If Russia is truly versed in Asiatic ways, does the premise of one family member arriving lead to all the relatives following? Not on the scale of attempting Russification that took place in previous territorial acquisitions but rather the possible influx of the Russian mafia.
Putin clearly stated the region is an originating point for illegal drugs that infiltrate into the Russian Federation. If military and security forces do become heavily involved in the area, does the Kremlin have the will power to fight a war on drugs thousands of
kilometers from home?

The Russian presence there, be it the military or mafia, will smell a profit on this trade. Either by taking control or at least assisting by directing supplies to other markets would further foreign policy efforts of weakening advisories. This golden (triangle) opportunity to further undermine opponents is not so far fetched taking into consideration the lack of a moral compass. The Kremlin has a fondness for talking about the importance of the United Nations and international law. Will that stop the Kremlin from pulling out its well worn box of dominoes and attempt to pick off the weaker states of ASEAN? The state most vulnerable is the Kingdom of Cambodia.39 Hanoi’s ability to sway the Phnom Penh’s decision
making and Russia’s available financial resources to corrupt this impoverished nation make it an obvious choice. Interest in controlling drug trafficking opportunities are one opportunity but four other factors come into play. A playground and safe haven for Russia’s elite (mafia), thwart the Chinese influence there as Cambodia has been historically used to flank Russia’s ally Vietnam, obtaining a warm deep water seaport at
Sihanoukville, and the recent discovery of petroleum reserves of the coast.₄₀

The first stage already has commenced. One fifth of Cambodia’s GDP is based on tourism and an influx of rubles will be warmly accepted. In September 2006, the Cambodian government approved plans by th Russian Koh Pos Investment Group to construct a US$300 million resort on Koh Pos (Snake Island). Vietnamese sway over the government in Phnom Penh may have helped push the deal through. The new Russian
spirit of cooperation undoubtedly lacks of moral character in its efforts there. Recently Alexander Trofimov, leader of the Koh Pos Investment Group, was sentenced and imprisoned for having sex with 10 underage girls.₄₁ It would take the boldness of a mafia boss to believe he was untouchable and above the law as in the Russian motherland. The only Russian eatery in Sihanoukville, the appropriately named Snake Restaurant, is probably a convenient meeting place for the Russians planning to dissect the area. Countering the Chinese there may be difficult to counter as the Cambodians received substantial amounts of financial aid and technical assistance from Beijing.

Ethnic Khmer-Chinese control the daily commerce and legitimate Chinese infrastructure developments are strong points favoring Beijing. However, Moscow would have to better this to influence the Cambodians who have a history of using apparent neutrality to milk foreign aid. Rather than having true understanding of Asian cultures, as the Chinese do, it seems the Russians are better at knowing how not to offend (than the Americans) than actually function in a Asian society. For example, the Russian Embassy in Phnom Penh is conveniently situated near the main Cambodian government buildings. No doubt this emphasizes cooperation (and assists the ability to spy) on the Khmer state. The Americans on the other hand built a large embassy complex, affectionately called “Fort USA” by ex-pats), directly across of Phnom Penh’s most sacred monument, Wat Phnom. Oddly the two Russian Restaurants in Phnom Penh had strategic locations. One was located next to the former US Embassy, an ideal point for surveillance point. The other on the south side of the city was conveniently located near many foreign embassies and consulates. The lush Irina’s Restaurant, did not seem to have the amount of customer traffic necessary to keep it viably open. With dishes and drinks costing double of what other local businesses charge, one wonders how who is funding the operation. It is the hangout of choice for the commercial pilots who fly all the domestic routes in Cambodia and they are all Russian. If one can think of a better way to set up a surveillance network
to view who is traveling where inside a nation or what development can be observed by low-level aerial flights, one can be sure that the SRV would like to hear this. The tourism industry being developed in Cambodia is conveniently nearby Sihanoukville. During the Vietnamese conflict, the government of Cambodia turned a blind eye to arms shipments intended for Viet Cong forces imported through its southern ports. So the appearance Russian naval presence is nothing new but may carry a heavier price tag to satisfy the fattened Khmer elites. Unfortunately this could lead to Cambodia becoming another victim squashed between to powerful nations.₄₂ The overall scenario of Russia’s involvement throughout Southeast Asia does not did for a bright future. If traditional behavior, open cooperation and covert actions does continue in foreign policy choices, the consequences will retard human development. In expected results of Moscow’s policies or unintended consequences, trouble awaits in the not to distant future. Is this a condemnation of the Russians or a pessimistic outlook for the future? Not entirely, it is crucial to illuminate the reality of a problem before actions can be ascertained.

Bluntly put, the Russians are about as interested in human development overseas as they are at home. The most obvious way to deceive is to operate completely out in the open. This was a technique used by the KGB in its most successful operations.₄₃ Does 21st century Russia truly have a change of heart?How will it behave when involved towards weaker states that are easily corruptible? Further research into the Russians forward operations in the ASEAN bloc, may assist awareness of the situation and the need to formulate a long term and flexible countermeasures. Closing with the comments of Sergei Tretyakov, an ex-KGB/SVR officer, underlines what this new cooperative Russia is in reality capable of.₄₄

I want to warn Americans. As a people, you are very naive about Russia and its intentions. You believe because the Soviet Union no longer exists, Russia is now your friend. It isn’t, and I can show you how the SVR is trying to destroy the U.S. even today and even more than the KGB did during the cold war. Historically the Russians have been cruel to each other, dominant of their partners, and paranoid of their enemies. The modern multi-polar world only complicates these issues and Moscow’s behavior in this environment, upping the challenge to the West.

Notes: Viet Nam Foreign Policy – Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

1 Russian were adapted to Asiatic diplomacy and style of governance after 2 centuries of Mongol rule. Charles Morris, Historical Tales- Russian (New York: R.H. Whitten Co., 1904), 309.

2“Russia must be allowed to develop a democracy that fit with its history.” Vladimir Putin. Ireland Online..“Bush and Putin Hold ‘Get Along’ Summit.” http://breakingnews.iol.ie/news/?c=ireland&jp=kfsnauqlojsn. (accessed 10 March 2008).

3 Andrei Gromyko, 28 year reign as foreign minister ended in 1985, was a main supporter of Mikhail Gorbachev’s appointment as General Secretary of the communist party stating, “He is very good, very quick at grasping the essence of processes that are taking place outside our
country.” Robbin F. Laird, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1987), 240.

4 Gorbachev based foreign policy on respect for world opinion and not threatening to others. Andrei P.Tsygankov. Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 36.

5 John Lewis Gaddis. We Now Know : Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

6 A common view is that outside forces cause Russia to react to the outside world. George. Liska, Russia and the Road to Appeasement : Cycles of East-West Conflict in War and Peace (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 17.

7 National security for the U.S.S.R. involved transferring its principals. John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 16.

8 Cooperation is at the Ministerial Level in the areas of Politics & Security, Economics, Agriculture & Forestry, Culture & Arts, Disaster Management, Energy, Environment, Finance, Haze, Health, Information, Investment, Labor, Law, Mekong Basin Development Cooperation, Rural Development & Poverty Eradication, Science & Technology, Social Welfare & Development, Telecommunications & IT, Tourism, Transnational Crime, Transport, and Youth. ASEAN, “Areas Of ASEAN Cooperation”, http://www.aseansec.org/ (accessed on April 24th, 2008).

9 Laird, Soviet Foreign Policy, 244.

10 Marek Thee, Notes of a witness; Laos and the Second Indochinese War. (New York: Random House,1973), 342.

11Pete Earley. Comrade J : The Untold Secrets of Russia’s Master Spy in America after the End of the Cold War (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2007.)

12 Once a member of the Soviet Union’s Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) from1978 to 1991, SRV joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007 becoming the 150th member. William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 368.

13 Business Network, “Vietnam helps Cambodia join ASEAN 20 years afterforay” ,http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_1998_Dec_14/ai_53483957 (accessed on March 29th, 2008).

14 The other ASEAN members voted for Vietnam to be the representative candidate for this position. Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations, “PM Confident of nation’s UN Security Council Seat,” http://www.vietnam-un.org/en/news.php? id=9&cid=2 (accessed on March 27th, 2008).

15 Vietnamese Diplomatic Missions, “Viet Nam, Russia agree on Russia’s WTO admission,” http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vnemb.la/vnemb.vn/tinkhac/ns070628024311 (accessed on April 25th, 2008).

16 UNDP, “Human Development Reports, “ http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (accessed on March 25th, 2008).

17 Open Democracy, ‘Russia’s NGO Law: The Wrong Target,” http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-institutions_government/russia_ngo_3123.jsp (accessed on April 22nd, 2008).

18Joel Brinkley. “Russian NGO Swims in Seas of Hypocrisy”. The Sacremento Bee, April 12th,2008, Editorial section.

19 Russia currently ranks 24th among 78 foreign investors in Viet Nam. Vietnamese Diplomatic Missions, ‘Legislator calls for more investment from Russia,”http://www.mofa.gov.vn /vnemb.la/vnemb.vn/tin_hddn/ns080305081530 (accessed on April 22nd, 2008).

20 Russia was invited in Southeast Asia by Ho Chi Minh, a pragmatist, chose Leninism based its organizational framework to defeat French. Saying it was needed to defeat a major power like France. William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh ( New York: Hyperion, 2000), 570.

21 Organ of the Military Central Commission and Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense, “Exchange celebrates victory over fascists”, http://army.qdnd.vn/vietnam.Culture-Sports.cnews.14877.qdnd (accessed April 20th, 2008).

22William Taubman, Khrushchev : The Man and his Era (New York: Norton, 2003), 424.

23 Asia Times Online, ‘Russian Missiles to guard Skies Over Vietnam,” http://www.atimes.com/atimes/ Central_Asia/EI05Ag02.html (accessed April 19th, 2008)

24 The Soviet-Vietnamese alliance in air defenses during the Vietnam conflict claims to have shot down six times the amount of aircraft the US has reported to have lost. The 3,000 Soviet military advisors were officially never there. Russia Today, “USSR ‘Secret’ Vietnam Soldiers Speak Out, “http://russiatoday.ru/news/news/21019 (accessed on March 14th, 2008).

25 Currently there are only 4 available tourist guide books about Vietnam in Russian. Footprint Travel, New Vietnam destination to Russia,”http://www.footprintsvietnam.com/Travel_News/May07/Vietnam-NewDestination-ToRussia.htm (accessed April22nd, 2008).

26 Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transitions, “Russia – BOFIT Weekly”, http://www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/BB8939BD-EE1F-4E6A-8DE9-A872B811EA31/0/w052007.pdf, (accessed on March 23rd, 2008).

27 Vietnam National Administration of Tourism, International visitors to Vietnam in December and 12 months of year 2007,” http://www.vietnamtourism.gov.vn/english/index.phpoption=com_content&task=view&id=1224&Itemid=45 (accessed April 23rd, 2008).

28 Russia has a Navy maintenance site in the port of Tartus, Syria. Global Security, “Russia has no plans to build navy bases in Syria – FM Lavro,“ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2007/02/mil-070221-rianovosti01.htm

29 Even though its pull out was imminent, the Soviets offered to withdraw its naval forces if the United States would do the same with its military bases. Robbin F. Laird, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1987), 347.

30 “Such wars must be taken seriously as they can lead to major conflict between the 2 different world social systems.” Lectures notes smuggled out of the Soviet Voroshilov Military Academy. Ghulam Dastagir Wardak,The Voroshilov Lectures, Vol.1. (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1989) 76.

31 George Liska, Russia and the Road to Appeasement : Cycles of East-West Conflict in War and Peace, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 50.

32 VietnmamNet Bridge, “Moscow Shuts Centre for Viet Kieu Trade,” http://english.vietnamnet.vn/social/2007/11/757380/ (accessed on March18th, 2008).

33 Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “Young Vietnamese Community Successful in Foreign land. http://www.mofa. gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105039/ ns071218080330 (accessed on March 8th, 2008).

34 “They are very interested in developing relations with Russia not only in the energy sector but in other areas as well, including high-tech, space, telecommunications, communications, the iron and steel industry and naturally in military and technical cooperation.” Vladimir Putin.
Ministry of Foreign Afffairs of the Russian Federation “Vladimir Putin answered Russian journalists’ questions, Bocharov Ruchei, Sochi, December 16, 2005,”http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/e524cd15d95bed47c32570dc003edb79?OpenDocument (accessed February 26th, 2008)

35Vietnam’s Cambodian invasion ended up costing the Soviets 3 million per day to support it. C.B. Jones, The Cold War (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 2004), 109.

36 Association of Southeast Asian Nations,“ASEAN-Russia: Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia Pacific,” http://www.aseansec.org/18878.htm (accessed March 20th, 2008).

37Asian Political News, “Russia cozies up to ASEAN, vows to deepen cooperation,”http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0WDQ/is_2005_Dec_19/ai_n15957324 (accessed February 24th, 2008).

38 The major change in the ASEAN states, is they made efforts to self-stabilize through “the application of capital, education and technology to an abundant labour supply”. Stephen Grenville at his talk to International Seminar on East Asia Financial Crisis- Beijing, 21 April

39 On May 30th, 2007 Russian Ambassador Valery Y.Tereshenko stated, “Cambodia is our main partner in the Russia’s discussion with ASEAN both in bilateral and multi lateral.” Cambodia News, “ Russia: Cambodia is our main partner,” http://www.khmernews.com/view/russia-cambodia-is-our-main-partner/425/ ( accessed on April 25th, 2008).

40 Henry Kamm, Cambodia : report from a stricken land. (New York : Arcade Publications, 1998), 202.

41 Novosti, March 13th, 2008, “Russian man gets 13 years in Cambodian jail on child sex charges,” http://en.rian.ru/world/20080314/101304678.html, (accessed on April 20th, 2008).

42 Marek Thee, Notes of a witness; Laos and the Second Indochinese War, 339.

43 Pete Earley. Comrade J : The Untold Secrets of Russia’s Master Spy in America after the End of the Cold War (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2007.)

44 Pete Earley. Comrade J : The Untold Secrets of Russia’s Master Spy in America after the End of the Cold War, 8.

UN Transitional Authority Cambodia

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

“In many senses, the UN was moving into new territory with this.”₁

The end of the Cold War was proclaimed a new era in human history and the spirit of new interstate cooperation amongst formerly opposing ideological systems. Yet before the Soviet empire began to crumble, a new era was developing in intrastate conflicts. Many of the longstanding civil wars, which were proxy wars for the major powers, were no longer high level priorities in foreign policies.2 The civil war raging in Cambodia is a prime example. In what has to be the longest running political “novella” of the 20 th century, the four factions in Cambodia were guilty of political incest.3 The internal conflict for control left all parties extremely distrustful of each other and any outside intervention. In a state of
shell shock, the Cambodian people held even more distrust. Once the relations improved between the United States, Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China, only then did a peace settlement obtain fruition. After 10,000 days of fighting produced a stalemate, ten years of peace negotiations assisted by the United Nations and regional states, produced an agreement to allow application of a UN mandate. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), a comprehensive, ambitious, and expensive undertaking, met with mixed results.

Unfortunately, this agreement was used as political tool by the four factions to continue their respective preferences for an outcome. On the 23rd of October 1991 the Paris Peace agreements were reached between the Supreme National Council (SNC4) representing Cambodia, five permanent members of the UN Security Council, six members of ASEAN, Australia, Canada, India, Japan, Laos, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia as chairman of the non-aligned nations movement. In response the UN Security Council unanimously supported Resolution 718, calling for the Secretary-General to develop a comprehensive plan. The mandate developed, Resolution 745, was to cost 1.6 billion dollars and last one and a half years. 5 The agreements included a framework of three basic instruments; a comprehensive political settlement, sovereignty issues, and rehabilitation and reconstruction. The document also laid out the agenda for the UNTAC mandate. In January 1992, leadership of the UN was passed from Boutros Boutros-Ghali to Pérez de Cuéllar, who quickly allocated 200 million dollars due to both urgency and difficulty of mounting such a comprehensive program. The political instrument of the agreement entitled the authority of administrating almost all aspects of the internal affairs of Cambodia to UNTAC. The SNC would function as an advisory body to UNTAC in the developing this and temporarily represent the Kingdom of Cambodia in foreign affairs, translating to a seat in the UN general Assembly. SNC recommendations to UNTAC were required to be unanimous supported by its members, and if not the chairman of the SNC, after considering advice from the group, would have finally the word. The advice to UNTAC was ultimately decided upon by Secretary-General’s Special Representative who was to ensure it met the requirements of the UN mandate. Some of the major issues that were the focus of the mandate: commencement of a ceasefire and demobilization of forces, measures to hold democratic elections, and establishing legitimate sovereignty. From the moment the agreements were signed, an immediate cease fire was to occur. All deployment, movement, or actions by troops was to halt. The factions were to report all their respective military forces strength levels and location of troops and armaments, plus detailed records of land mines and other anti-
personnel devices. Most importantly, all foreign parties and their military hardware supporting the four factions were to be removed from Cambodian soil. The halting for foreign military assistance dramatically lowered the capabilities of the domestic warring factions, yet in reality, this allowed breathing space to recover from decades of fighting and began a period of political maneuvering.
Measures to develop free and fair elections were to be created from the ground up; electoral laws, dispute resolution, voter and party registration, observation, polling staff and training, public awareness, equal access to media for parties and codes of ethical conduct, being some of the aspects. The partnership between the SNC and UNTAC were vital in creating a minimal level of trust from the Cambodian people after decades of death and destruction influenced by outside forces. The component for the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and
inviolability, neutrality and national unity of Cambodia had a dual purpose. It called upon members of the United nations not interfere in any way, especially militarily or politically in Cambodian affairs. UNTAC from within Cambodian territory, was to insure no agreements or alliances developed which may alter a condition of full neutrality in foreign affairs. Foreign involvement, overtly and covertly, had been slowly bleeding to death the Khmer nation. Finally, the rehabilitation and reconstruction component was temporary measure designed to stand Cambodia back on it feet for self governance. There was illusion that long term commitments would be needed but the mandate was only a framework on which to build.

27 years of war left Cambodia’s civil, social, and economic society in total ruin. Four million land mines covered the country, 200,000 orphans existed, 360,000 lived in refugee camps across the border in Thailand, and 180,000 internally displaced people had to be resettled because of the fighting. Decades of lawlessness created a mistrust of any type of authority. It was essential to jump start a civil society by focusing on the following seven components:

Civil Administration- A hybrid system between the UN and SNC. The UN trusteeship responsible for governing over foreign affairs, national defense, finance, public security, and information. The SNC given national sovereignty during the transition period. ₆

Civilian Police- UNTAC representatives were to manage operational control and conduct Cambodian police force n a ratio of 1:15. Basic levels of law and order were obtained.

Electoral System- A system built from the ground up. Historically there were no previous democratic elections and culturally at odds with the tradition of deferring decision making to elders.₇

Human Rights- Basically an introduction for international recognized human rights into Cambodian society by educating the SNC and populace. The goal was to have the new government ratify and support these issues and the public to be aware of these new policies. In reality human rights issues not enforced and violence increased as elections approached.₈

Military- A ceasefire and the verified departure of all foreign military forces. 70% of existing armies were to be cantoned, weapons confiscated and destroyed. Mines removed and populace educated on dangers of UXO.₉

Rehabilitation- Short term humanitarian needs were to be provided for. The multitudes of disadvantaged- displaced, handicapped, and orphaned people, along reintegrating of demobilized militias compounded the situation which required additional international aid. Infrastructure development was also targeted. Long term rehabilitation to be the responsibility of newly elected government.₁₀

Repatriation- The safe returning of refugees, mainly from camps in Thailand, to be given land and to take part in the electoral process. Fell behind schedule in land distribution and a money offered instead.

A budget of 1.6 billion dollars included an enormously diverse UN staff of approximately 20,000 and the training and hiring of 50,000 Cambodians to assist in the elections. Forty seven countries sent mainly military and civilian police personnel. Ten states were allocated military control over large districts- Bangladesh, Bulgaria, France, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Netherlands, Tunisia, and Uruguay, But often
differed decision making towards their respective governments. The nine regional states added to the commitment of restoring peace and security. Eighty UN fatalities occurred, and 400 Cambodians lost their lives to political violence in the drive towards free and fair elections.

Though often criticized in retrospect, the efforts of such a comprehensive move by the UN was a success. The complex matrix of goals designed to have the nation functioning within the time frame met acceptable levels. The multitude of states involved in the project added to the legitimacy of the efforts. Had only a few been involved, the goal of a neutral sovereign free of influence, would have been unobtainable. Democratic elections, though marred with violence, took place and reached a satisfactory level of free and fair. A longer stay would have waned international support and certainly been resented by the populace. Short term efforts within Cambodia produced peace and security for the region for the past 16 years. The UN mandate was far from perfect but Cambodia again had a heartbeat and was left with responsibility for its own recovery.

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APPENDIX A – SECURITY COUNCIL VOTING RECORD ON UNTAC

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

Security Council resolution 745 (1992) [on establishment of the UNTAC
Yes: 15, No: 0, Abstentions: 0, Non-Voting: 0, Total voting membership: 015
Vote Date: 28 February 1992
Security Council Members:
Austria Cape Verde Hungary Morocco United States
Belgium Ecuador India Russian Federation Venezuela
China France Japan United Kingdom Zimbabwe

APPENDIX B – UNTAC BASIC FACTS₁₂
Headquarters: Phnom Penh, Cambodia Duration: 18 months; FEB 1992 – SEP 1993
Special Representative: Yasushi Akashi (Japan) JAN 1992 – SEP 1993
Force Commander: Lieutenant-General John Sanderson (Australia) MAR1992 – SEP1993
Police Commissioners:
Brigadier-General Klaas Roos (Netherlands) MAR 1992 – AUG1993
Deputy Inspector General Shahudul Haque (Bangladesh) (Acting) AUG- SEP1993
Contributors of Military and Civilian Police: Total Personnel- 19,350
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria,
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Nepal,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Russian
Federation, Senegal, Sweden, Thailand, Tunisia, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay
Fatalities: 82 total
Expenditures: $1.6 billion (Including the cost of UNAMIC)

NOTES – UN Transitional Authority Cambodia – Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

1 Lieutenant General John Sanderson. “General Recalls UNTAC’s Groundbreaking Mission,” The Cambodian Daily, 23 August 2007.

2 John T. Fishel, The savage wars of peace : toward a new paradigm of peace operations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 100.

3 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, ed. Encyclopedia of international peacekeeping operations (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 26.

4 SNC, which was made up of the four warring Cambodian factions, delegated to the United Nations “all powers necessary” to ensure the implementation of the Agreements. United Nations,“Cambodia UNAMIC Background”, available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamicbackgr.html; Internet; accessed 16 September 2009.

5 Resolution A/RES/47/210B; Financing of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, adopted at the 100th plenary meeting, 14 September 1993. United Nations, “Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its 47th session”; available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/res/resa47.htm; Internet;accessed 18 September 2009.

6 James Dobbins, The UN’s role in nation-building : from the Congo to Iraq. (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005),87.

7 David Carment, Conflict prevention : path to peace or grand illusion? (New York : United Nations University Press, 2003), 77.

8 Janet Heininger, Peacekeeping in transition : the United Nations in Cambodia (New York : Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994), 95.

9 Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, ed., United Nations interventionism, 1991-2004 (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2007), 44.Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacfacts.html; Internet; accessed 22 September 2009. Berdal, Mats and Economides, Spyros, ed. United Nations iIterventionism, 1991-2004. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2007.

10 Michael W. Doyle, UN peacekeeping in Cambodia : UNTAC’s civil mandate . (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 49.

11 United Nations Bibliographic Information System, “Voting Records Search”, available
from http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&menu=search.; Internet;
accessed on 23 September 2009.

12 United Nations, “Cambodia UNTAC Facts & Figures”, available from http://www.un.org/

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

Carment, David. Conflict Prevention : Path to Peace or Grand Illusion? New York : United Nations University Press, 2003.

Dobbins, James. The UN’s role in nation-building : from the Congo to Iraq. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2005.

Doyle, Michael W. UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia : UNTAC’s Civil mandate. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995. Finnemore, Martha. The Purpose of Intervention : Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003.

Fishel John T. The Savage Wars of Peace. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998.

Heininger, Janet. Peacekeeping in Transition: the United Nations in Cambodia. New York:Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994.

Ramsbotham,Oliver and Woodhouse,Tom, ed. Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operations. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999.

10 Michael W. Doyle, UN peacekeeping in Cambodia : UNTAC’s civil mandate . (Boulder :
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), 49.United Nations.“Cambodia UNAMIC Background.” Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamicbackgr.html. Internet; accessed 16 September 2009.

United Nations. “Cambodia UNTAC facts & Figures.” Available from
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacfacts.html. Internet; accessed 22 September 2009.

United Nations. “Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its 47th session.” Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/res/resa47.htm. Internet; accessed 18 September 2009.

United Nations Bibliographic Information System. “Voting Records Search.” Available from http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&menu=search.. Internet; accessed 23 September 2009.1 Lieutenant General John Sanderson. “General Recalls UNTAC’s Groundbreaking
Mission,” The Cambodian Daily, 23 August 2007.
2 John T. Fishel, The savage wars of peace : toward a new paradigm of peace operations
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 100.
3 Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, ed. Encyclopedia of international
peacekeeping operations (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 26.
4 SNC, which was made up of the four warring Cambodian factions, delegated to the
United Nations “all powers necessary” to ensure the implementation of the Agreements.
United Nations,“Cambodia UNAMIC Background”, available from
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamicbackgr.html; Internet; accessed
16 September 2009.

19th Century Russian Industrialization – Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

Understanding the development of Russian industrialization during the world’s 2nd Industrial Revolution is the examining of forces outside it’s borders combined with internal reactions. The additional pressure from events and actors on the Southern and Eastern Frontiers were new additions to the traditional Western European modernizing forces. Two major topics that dominated these efforts were active European capital involvement that phased to passive investment, and the rise and fall of Sergei Witte. The first industrial revolution not only raised European living standards but also created the philosophies behind modern economics. These social and technological advances coupled with imperialism created growing world powers with which Russia had to contend. Foremost the British policy of trade specialization and imperial extraction of lesser countries resources were a major threat to Russia. At the mid 19th century , Russia had industrialization based on the efforts of Peter the Great, no real modern banking system, and wealth based on an antiquated agricultural society. Serf emancipation was dead in the water without a constitutional based law to support economic development. To complicate matters more land owning nobility was entrenched in the status quo of the fore mentioned system. There were endless natural resources and wealth scattered throughout the vast empire but no system to focus the savings into massive capitol investment. The main product of late 19th century industrialization is steel and would be an excellent focal point for examination. Advanced techniques in production and the owners of natural resources are surely vital in the production of steel but these factors pale in comparison to the major driving forces in the creation of industrial might, investment and credit. In the 1850’s Russian Steel industry was in its infancy and was threatened early on by imports. Before major European investments, Germany was the largest import of steel and iron products into Russia. Governmental efforts to increase domestic production were often not from investment but protectionism. Tariff wars developed and often exploded. During trade negotiations between Germany and Russia in 1893, the New York Times1 reported a modest 25% German Import Duty on goods while Russian’s Finance Minister Witte responded with 100% rate. The article stated Russia would have to soon back down and that they underestimated German economic and industrial power. Witte stated that though regrettable it was done in self-defense. How is it that a government could use such protectionist tariffs to promote industrialization? Three factors were influencing the Czarist government: 1) The development of steel and iron industries were vital to national defense, which would include building a navy and major railway system. Previous defeats in recent wars with Western Powers and the lack of solid alliances left her vulnerable. 2) Free trade policies and philosophies were promoted by the dominant world powers and free market competition would leave Russia in her backwards state. 3) Russia’s closed society traditionally placed the nation’s financial burden on the serf populace. The higher prices and low standard of living was the norm and the autocratic government could use this while modernization was implemented. Tariffs were a common tactic used by the Russians but it could not be a driving force in rapid industrial growth. The spark that truly attributes to the phenomenal growth begins with foreign investment from Western Europe. Russia’s relationship with the different nations drastically effected where foreign investment was distributed. Belgian and French interests developed in Southern Russia while German influence within the Baltic States. England had less influence in major industries of manufacture and machinery but concentrated on petroleum in the Caucasus and mining industry, especially gold. Though metallurgy and mining were the leading areas of foreign capitol investments, textiles, petroleum, chemicals, banks, agricultural products, lumber, and cement are just a few of many other industrial interests. The early partnerships that formed were unique in that Western capitalists joined with Russian proprietors. John P. McKay2 states it simply and most accurately as, “Western industrial firms affiliated with Russian enterprise”. Of course everything was done with permission from the Czarist Government. Active involvement is the best characterization of Western foreign firms operating within the Russian Empire. Foreign capital was raised by European institutions and an inside Russian partner was used. This was absolutely crucial for success. Then the use of advanced technologies and Western engineering management worked in conjunctions with local Russians. The corruption and bureaucracy of Muscovy was an obstacle but also a blessing. Government contracts captured the bulk of industrial production for a secure and steady consumer. A firm’s favorable standing with the Czar and his Ministers often meant success or failure. Thus the importance of internal Russian contacts was a key element. Unique to these European based firms operating far from Western headquarters were the advance responsibilities laid out in detail to chief engineering managers. Critical decisions could often be made on the front lines without waiting for permission from the home firm. The government’s willingness to allow foreign involvement in Russia was not in the style of “laissez-faire” economics. Under Moscow’s central control and watch dog local authorities, the West could not exploit the Russian system. No major industrial cartels or corporate trusts could be formed to wield influence and pressure on governmental economic decisions. An example of this would be foreign banks were important sellers of Russian government bonds. Foreign built factories associated with these banks would ask them to pressure the Russians for a merger of these factories into a trust. The inefficient factories could then be closed and the profitable plants could meet government quotas. Since this would involve the laying off of Russian workers, the government flatly refused. On the local level Russian authorities displayed the same firmness. An interesting example of their attitude is cited in McKay’s book Pioneers for Profit. During a strike at the Odessa Tramway Company in 1903, the vice-director confidentially reported: “At one point the chief of the secret police of Odessa told me almost word for word: “You must accept the strikers’ conditions. If you do not, I shall have you led immediately to the border by two gendarmes, and we shall seize the company which will be lost to you in any event. It is of no importance to us if all your Belgian millions are lost; our only concern is that no Russian blood is shed in the streets.” These two examples, though extreme, show that the Russians were aware of the exploitation that could be had by capitalist firms in a weaker foreign land. One only needs to look at the Chinese experience of being carved up with the European stamp of extraterritoriality. Examining the American experience with labor strikes in that time period shows a constitutional government’s Supreme Court protecting the property rights of industry and allowing Federal forces to suppress striking workers. Not a good example for the Russian government to aspire to. The Russian workforce employed by this rapid development offered another challenge. Two distinct situations appeared between the Northern and Southern regions. Lower wages predominated and a steady supply of workers were available in the northern cities. The agricultural southern section of Russia was unique in that the workers were seasonal. After the harvest the factories would fill with workers but with the arrival of warmer weather they headed back to the fields. Higher wages were needed to entice workers to stay. Housing was supplied only for the men in barracks during employment A key factor to these factories success in resolving this labor shortage was when small homes were provided for the men and their families. Thus the drastic seasonal worker migration was controlled. In regards to the Marxists’ opinions towards foreign investment into modernizing the Russian Industry, it was generally favorable. Factories were an excellent field in which to sow political seeds of change. Even though the late 19th century was a time of rising anarchist and revolutionary groups and tactics of violence and assassinations against the Czarist government, I could not find much evidence of this type of aggression against Westerners in Russia. The often discriminated Polish and Jewish workers within Russia’s Empire benefited from the introduction of European factory management. Foreign firms aggressively put to use Polish Engineers and Russian Jews into commerce positions. Companies that employed them found them to be excellent in mid-managerial positions. As the century closed developing Russian nationalism and worker movements did offer much opposition to these often hated foreigners hired by Western firms inside Russia. As the 20th Century appeared there was a dramatic shift in the trends of European investment in Russian industrialization. Internally firms were forming that could organize Russia domestic capital for investment and Russian banks began working directly with Western capitalist investors. Experience from partnerships with the West was an important factor but there was also an influx of returning students educated from the West. At one time foreign banks raised capitol for investment in Russia but this evolved into Russian banks going westward in search of funds. This was a dramatic shift for European investment towards passive investment. Initially the foreigners had an advantage with the ability to leverage capital structure for maximum profits in Russia. The high disposable incomes of the West were abundant but it was the advantage of organizing and seeking investment opportunities that was the real advantage. Russia did go through a tremendous industrial growth period but as the new century appeared the worldwide economy took a slight downturn. Smaller reserves of investment capital along with coupled this with political unrest developing in 20th Century Russia slowed the industrial boom witnessed earlier. This general overview of the rise and decline of late 19th Century Russian industrialization parallels the career and events in the life of one of Russia’s most dramatic figures, Sergei Iulevich Witte. Faced with a daunting task, Witte was always confronted with a daunting task working within an autocratic system which he loyal supported, and that within that same system that strongly opposed him. To try and understand his place in Russian history it is important to see how the world viewed him and how he himself viewed his position. Witte is magnificently summarized in this article from the Wall Street Journal3, “De Witte, the newly appointed Russian Minister of Finance, was fifteen years ago, mere village station master on the railroad from Kieff to Odessa. He is indebted for his rapid rise and promotion to the fact that on one memorable occasion he disobeyed orders. He had received certain instructions with regard to the transportation of troops to Bulgaria, and finding there with would have resulted in hopeless confusion he took upon himself to act in direct opposition there to.

Called to account for his disobedience he was able to prove to the satisfaction of his superiors that he had acted in the only manner certain to prove successful, and that the instructions transmitted to him were entirely wrong. This attracted to him the attention of M. Wichnegradsky, the ex-minister of Finance, who was at that time president of the railroad by which M. de Witte was employed. On M. Wichnegradsky becoming Minister of Finance he brought the young station master with him to St. Petersburg, where he rapidly promoted him from one post to another until he has now succeeded him as Minister of Finance of the empire.
M. de Witte is about 43 years old, wears a full beard, his hair rather long, and dresses very badly. He always looks as if he were a man engaged in scientific pursuits who had been up all night endeavoring to solve some abstruse problem. He is very simple and unaffected and strongly opposed to phraseology and flowery speech. The Emperor is very fond of him and it is owing to his Majesty’s favor and confidence in his absolute integrity and sterling honesty that he is indebted for his present remarkable promotion.”

After reading many other summaries and facts about Witte, this article hits the nail on the head. Examining his memoirs one finds him to be quite a self involved character. His main attributes were strategic planning and observing the characteristics of those around him. He admittedly often states that he often ignored the details of projects and always kept a grand overall view of the big picture. The observations he made of an individuals character had two effects in his judgment. Those he thought highly of were often given responsibility to carry out his plans. The individuals he deemed unworthy were doomed in his opinion to be forgotten by history. His memoirs are a rich history of information about the actors on the Russian economic stage but one must take into account it was written after the events occurred and the play was in its denouement. What difference a life long daily journal would have been we will never know. The person who probably knew him best, his wife4 wrote: “He was neither a courtier, flattering the throne, nor a demagogue, flattering the crowd. Being a member of the gentry, he, nevertheless never stood up for the privileges of the elite. My husband used to say: “I’m neither liberal, nor conservative. I’m simply a civilized person. I cannot exile a person to Siberia only because his way of thinking differs from mine. I cannot strip him of his civil rights only because he prays to God in a church different from mine.” The accomplishments during his lifetime must be weighed against the tremendously difficult backdrop of Russian society at the time. He was truly outspoken in his support for autocratic rule but at the same time had distain for the land owning status quo nobility. During his administration his attempts were often opposed by the dynasty of agriculture who believed in Russia’s system of oppressing the peasantry. Witte also dealt with two czars which added to his challenges. The main successes in career were in railroads, controlling foreign investment, creating a currency based on a gold standard, and state-management of industrialization, which included regulations for employees and factory conditions. Railroads were involved at the start of Witte career and truly helped him to reach his zenith. The Czar desired to put the nation’s railway system under government control. Even Witte admitted this was the Emperor’s idea. Not only was the railways system crucial for Russian industrialization and defense but also the arteries to the peoples of the nation for social development. During the early years of development “Railroad Kings”, as they were called, began to appear and their power in controlling this important networks was soon evident. The buying up and expansion of this system was the responsibility of Witte. There was also an underlining belief in that the introduction of the railways throughout the lands of the peasantry would some how be uplifting to their plight. Much is said about the grand Trans-Siberian Railway and its importance in Russia’s eastward expansion. Before this much was learned about the difficulties in building of the railroad across a great expanse and the effects on the local populace with the construction of the Trans-Caspian Railroad. Crossing the steppes would seem easy until one has deal with soft and shifting terrain but the real genius in its development was in the location of the lines. The planners of the Trans-Caspian Line kept the tracks a few miles outside of populated areas as not to alarm the local population with these smoke and steam iron dragons. The Russification of the Empire was truly a benefit of developing railways and other nations’ expansive interests around the perimeter could be thwarted by the completion of the Trans-Siberian Line. How can we relate to the actual cost of such an undertaking? The Wall Street Journal5 mentions the cost in comparison to building a North-South American Continental Railroad. In 1904 US Dollars, the Pan American Line would cost $175,000,000.00 but would be dwarfed by the $500,000,000.00 estimated by Witte for the Trans-Siberian & Manchurian Lines. This expansion in the East as we know led to the Russo-Nippon War which commenced the fall of autocratic rule. One might also look at the cost associated with it might have been used elsewhere to improve the Russian economy. Witte “big picture” view may have been more than Russia had the capacity for. His experience and favoritism toward railways may also been a blinding factor into the what the current state of the Empire’s economy really was in. Capital being essential to a developing industrial nation was a priority of Witte. A paper ruble and the need for outside investment was the problem. He created the gold standard for the ruble which increased investor confidence. Here is another classic example of the opposition from both external and internal forces towards his policies. The French at the time had a silver backed franc and hoped to influence the Russians in using this as their standards. Their hope of this or even a dual metallic standard, of gold and silver would have been profitable for the French. Witte wisely chose gold. The domestic opposition Witte faced can be explained in his stating, “Nearly the whole of Russia was against the reform. First, out of ignorance, second, out of habit and, third, out of the imaginary interest of certain classes of the population”. One gets the impression the man was going to accomplish what he believed was the proper course of action no matter what the opinions of the day were. Not only did the creation of a gold standard for the ruble increase Russia’s credit rating but it also helped weather the economic crisis creating by the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Further banking and investment policies were for increased Western and Jewish investment into Russia. This is a strong factor in his creating of enemies during his rise to power. One of his chief competitors, Vyacheslav Plehve6 the Minister of the Interior, used this as part of a plot to remove Witte from office. In August, 1903, Plehve passed on documents to Nicholas II that Witte was part of a Jewish conspiracy. As a result Witte was removed as Minister of Finance. An overview of Witte’s reign witnessed a tripling of industrial output and a doubling of the government’s budget. All this seems outstanding but agricultural output never reached expectations and Russia continued to import products during this time period. The intense use of tariffs by Witte though protecting industry seem to place just one more intolerable burden upon Russia’s peasantry, denying it the benefits economic of free trade and an industrializing society. Prices paid by the average Russian were over twice that in the West. Overall the threat to Russia was in becoming dependent on West. The fasting growing industrialization of the 19th Century was a remarkable success, but maybe an earlier switch to a form of free market capitalism instead of economic policy by decree, would have a better though difficult solution. The war with Japan in 1905 followed by the domestic unrest and the 1st World War placed a stain on his achievements. When one looks at the mixed results of his policies , one must remember Witte position was not only involved in economics but in the political and social fabric of Russia. Had a constitutional government taken hold from the seed of the October Manifesto7, we may have witnessed Sergei Iulevich Witte statues in place of Vladimir Ilich Lenin.

NOTES – Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

1 “Both Sides Getting Weary”, New York Times, 6 August 1897

2 John P. McKay, Pioneers for profit; foreign entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialization, 1885-1913.Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1970

3 “The Russian Minister”, Wall Street Journal, 6 October 1892

4 “Marking the 150th Birth Anniversary of Sergei Vitte, Russian Cultural navigator,” 2004 http://www.vor.ru/culture/cultarch77_eng.html 12 October 2004

5 “Pan American Railway”, Wall Street Journal, 21 January 1904

6 Vyacheslav Plehve served as Director of Police (1881-84), Vice-Minister of the Interior (1884-99) and Secretary of State for Finnish Affairs (1899-1902). During this period he subjected minorities to forced Russification and was responsible for the persecution of Jews and Armenians. In 1902 Plehve was appointed Minister of the Interior. His attempts at suppressing those advocating reform was completely unsuccessful. He also secretly organized Jewish Pogroms.

7 Witte, the new Chief Minister, advised Nicholas II to make concessions. He eventually agreed and published the October Manifesto. This granted freedom of conscience, speech, meeting and association. He also promised that in future people would not be imprisoned without trial. Finally he announced that no law would become operative without the approval of the State Duma.

BIBLIOGRAPHY – Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

Books

McKay, John P.. Pioneers for profit; foreign entrepreneurship and Russian Industrialization, 1885-1913. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1970

Lawrence, John . A History of Russia. New York: Penguin Group 1993

Morris, Charles. Russian Historic Tales. New York: R.H. Whitten Co. 1904

Vitte, S. IU. And Harcave, Sidney , ed. The Memoirs of Count Witte. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1990.

Internet Resources

Allen, Gary. “The Rockefeller File:Building the Big Red Machine” November. 1975 (21 November 2004)

Caplan, Bryan. “Czarist Origins of Communism, IV” (12 November 2004)

Douglas, Rachel and Frazier, Barbara, “Mendeleyev and Witte- The Fight To Bring The “AMERICAN SYSTEM” To 19th Centruy Russia Executive Intelligence Review, January, 1992 http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/russia1.htm 16 November 2004

George, Konstantin. ”The US-RUSSIAN Entente that saved the Union”. The Campaigner, 1978. < http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/russcwar.htm> (18
November 2004)

Halsall, Paul. “Table 1: League of Nations: Industrialization and World Trade (1945)”, “Tables 2-7: are based on the statistical appendices in the Fontana Economic History of Europe Vol 4, Part 2 “, “Table 8: figures from World Almanac 1992”. Aug 1997 < http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/indrevtabs1.html> (22 November 2004)

Halsall, Paul, Modern History Sourcebook,” Spread of Railways in 19th Century” August 1997 < http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/indrev6.html> 28 october 2004>

Knievel, Tim. “Industrial Supremacy” < http://www.tknievel.com/us2/17handout.htm> 22 October 2004

Slatter, John. Russian History Home Page , “Sergei Witte on the tasks for economic policy” < http://www.dur.ac.uk/~dml0www/witte.html> 28 October 2004

The Great Idea Finder, “Andrew Carnegie”, July, 2004 < http://www.ideafinder.com/history/inventors/carnegie.htm> (21 November 2004)

Reformation Online, “From Russia with Love — Grand Duke Alexander warns Americans about the Rockefeller Empire!”, Feb. 6, 2003 < http://www.reformation.org/from-russia-with-love.html> (19 November 2004)

Russian Cultural navigator, “Marking the 150th Birth Anniversary of Sergei Vitte” 2004 <http://www.vor.ru/culture/cultarch77_eng.html> 22 October 2004>

RussianAbroad.com , “Witte and Accelerated Industrialization” 12 October 2004 < http://www.russiansabroad.com/russian_history_41.html> 22 October 2004

“Sergei Witte,On The State Of Our Industry “ < http://euphrates.wpunj.edu/courses/hist330- 60/supplementary%20material/html/witte%20on%20industry.html> 14 November 2004

Wikipedia, “Sergei Witte”, < http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sergei_Witte> 26 October 2004

Ayub Khan – Friends Not Masters

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The intentions of any politician are of little consequence to history unless one succeeds or fails, and upon such results a spotlight is placed. Often, though, a forward thinking leader arises but due to mixed results, his or her accomplishments are buried in the rubble of history. In Ayub Khan’s autobiography, Friends Not Masters, written while holding office as Pakistan’s first president under a modern Islamic constitution, many lessons can be learned from his political techniques and reasoning which may applied to current domestic and international problems. Surely, new ideas are needed to solve some of the most stagnant issues. Extrapolating these progressive ideas from the self-written words of elite military leader and head of a Muslim nation in the mood of the times in which he lived, one must take a very neutral stance. The goal in this review of his auto-biography is to highlight those ideas which could be applied today. Mohamed Ayub Kahn served as Pakistan’s Commander-in-Chief from 1951 to 1958, and as president from 1958 until 1969. He was of Afghan heritage and raised in what is now northwest India. The son of a major in the British controlled Indian Army, his early education was geared towards his father’s desire for him to become a Hafiz, a memorizer of the Quran. An average student, he was adventurous and often rebellious being known to strike his instructors back after being slapped. At great expense to his
family, he was shuffled off to attend a high school some distance from his home. There he credits being on his own in a multicultural setting to his awakening to the political situation of the Indian subcontinent. Eventually shipping off to Sandhurst Military College in Britain, he excelled and
developed into a disciplined officer. He experienced some second class treatment but used this as a leadership opportunity by keeping the other colonial cadets inline as they tried to make trouble over such treatment. His philosophy was developing- don’t squabble over the small personal issues and self-interested viewpoints, but rather keep focused on the larger picture, the actual problem that threatens to thwart your success.
The Second World War found him fighting for the British Army in Burma along side Bengali citizens. This experience exposed him not only to the indiscriminate horrors of war but of Bengali culture and people which he grew fond of. Later in life this understanding of an area which would one day become East Pakistan, would help from his domestic policies and political negotiations. Pulled from the front before the end of the conflict, his experience was used in a training capacity, and he rapidly climb into military echelons. With the arrival of independence he chose to join the Pakistani Army, an ill equipped and under funded mess, that not only had to defend the nation but protect the 9 million refugees traversing west through rivers of blood caused by Hindu-Muslim tensions that were unleashed. In this situation he was faced with protecting the masses entering Pakistani territory with limited forces. These columns of under-protected refugees were often attacked by tribesman. Rather than confronting
the raiding tribesman, Khan negotiated with them ending needless bloodshed, not a typical tactic of a military leader. After the exodus his task was enormous, as not only did he face an antagonistic Indian nation, but an army that had never formed into distinct Muslim units was lacking in esprit de corps. The settlement promised by the British agreement allocate military resources to Pakistan but as the train loads of equipment arrived it was often broken military hardware or boxcars filled with rocks. At this point Khan realized that having no outside help ,the task of post-imperialist government was up to the Pakistanis. Thus began his struggle in awakening the people into a nation. Through his leadership the development of regional army units, not unlike the U.S.’s National Guard, from the ground up and with limited resources, turned the army into the only real success story in developing Pakistan. Additionally, a few yeasr after independence, a new constitution was hastily developed including all points of view. As the economy deteriorated and government squabbled, Khan further climbed the ranks to become commander-in-chief of the army. He witnessed the imported system of parliamentary democracy creating havoc in the Pakistani government and blamed this system
as being imposed from the outside by the British on a people who had not the political maturity to operate it. A sea of red tape, coalitions of the opportunists, and political parties developing their own uniformed militias, brought the country to standstill as the euphoria of independence faded. When the president suspended the constitution and declared marshal law, Khan followed in support. The president and Kahn quarreled on a plan of action resulting in a military coup. He took power by keeping the army in key locations but well out of sight, avoiding clashes with possible demonstrators, and openly declaring to the people that the intention of the coup was to fix the problems in Pakistan and return to a constitutional based government as quickly as possible. Having created the modern army loyal to him, gave Khan a firm grip on dictatorial power. The economic woes were compounded by the need for land reform, lack-luster leadership by the self-interested political parties, and a non-existent foreign policy. However, he had confidence that by removing certain obstacles, the Pakistani people and especially the class of civil servants previously subservient to a stagnant government, had the potential to turn the nation around. Khan instituted an overhaul of the system
realizing that his problems were shared by the rest of the decolonized world; having a foreign system imposed on them while they themselves had no sense of identity. He refers to this era as a revolution and its major cause the lack of awakening to the responsibilities of their own governance. The most stellar of Khan’s accomplishments were in the areas of border settlement and land reform. The Sino-Pakistani border had never been clearly demarcated. Khan approached the Communist Chinese who initially were unresponsive, with a very open minded plan. The Chinese, always suspicious of foreign intervention, accepted his plan. By presenting the goal of mutual satisfaction he alleviated suspicion, demarcating the border so as not to give a military advantage to either side. No advantage in occupying the high ground and not cutting off the herdsman from historic grazing pastures for the sake of political posturing were his main points of arguement. In light of the Communist Chinese attitude towards their common borders with India, Vietnam, Russia, and the issue of Taiwan, the settlement was a brilliant work of diplomacy.
The task of land reform was another triumph which in the end was accomplished without a drop of blood being shed. The issue was compounded by swelling of 9 million Muslim refugees from India on top of entrenched antiquated laws. The mass of tenant farmers inefficiently used the land of absentee landlords. Identifying 2.7 million acres of which two million were owned by 5,000 individuals, he redistributed theland to those who would work it. Loans to purchase plots (set at a maximum of 6,000 hectares per individual), fair compensation for surrendered land, plus land values set by productivity (lower crop output meant a lower purchase price) were the main points of the program. Khan labeled it social justice but insisted that absolutely no Soviet-style collective farming be permitted. Additionally, the refugees were also alloted land to purchase based on what they had lost in fleeing India, set to limits if losses could not be verified. Land ownership dramatically increased living standards and people’s stake in the newly formed nation. Reforming the traditional educational system also became a target. A paternal system of rote
memorization taught only in local dialects, dampened awareness as a nation, and ignored the reality of diversity across Pakistan. Reform was accomplished by teaching a national language, focusing on civic pride, promoting a creative spirit of initiative, and a teacher training program during summer months to standardize education.

Though issues dealing with Nehru’s India, which he blamed on the lack of a post independence plan of “neighborliness,” were a main focus of his career, the two other areas of progressive policies as the leader of a developing nation will be highlighted; foreign policy and the drafting of a constitution. Khan believed that the initial political freedoms under the first Pakistani government led to a policy of freedom to criticize your neighbors. In did not view states as friend or foe, rather philosophies engaged in combat. He stated the few large powerful states controlled the all the other nations destinies. He desired equality based on more than just sovereignty, placing honor and mutual respect as guiding principles in foreign policy. India’s military advantage needed to be offset without dragging the Cold War into the subcontinent or being viewed as a camp follower of the superpowers by the rest of the developing world. His policies slightly aligned with SEATO and the nations of the Baghdad Pact to
obtain U.S. aid, but he also kept open diplomatic channels with China and the Soviet Union. His geographic position enabled him to court Beijing’s sympathy as a thorn for India and he also commenced dialogue with the Soviets after 18 years of silence. A diplomatic visit to Moscow explaining his political position vis-a-vis with a non-aligned India, had made the Soviet’s sympathetic to his version of neutrality. He bluntly stated a strong Pakistan was needed to keep a balance of power against a “non-aligned” India (Khan called it “fence-sitting”), as a opportunistic delaying tactic before colonizing the subcontinent. He directly questioned the Kremlin’s philosophy of combating colonialism while arming India, a country with a caste system, fully intent on expansion. The economic situation facing Pakistan was a life threatening one. Khan calculated India would
eventually go to war with Pakistan crippling the economy to the point where it could be seized as a satellite. Needing to strengthen the economy and avoiding war, he negotiated a massive foreign aid from the West. The headwaters of the Indus river were being developed so as to give India control of the supply. Taking this problem to the West, he requested economic aid resolving the issue before a conflict occurred. Eventually one billion dollars was obtained for water projects securing Pakistan’s needs by using tact and emphasizing the problem not the politics. It was a well calculated move towards a peaceful solution rather than an arms race to a conflicting finish. The creation of a new constitution presented two major issues. The parliamentary democratic system of government allowed for too much tribal politics. To counter this, Khan pushed for government headed by a strong executive branch with the president empowered to appoint regional governors, the office’s cabinet, and right to dismiss the prime minister. His intentions were not for dictatorial rule but rather the type of government that could move the squabbling country forward. The judicial branch of a constitutional government was also of great concern. How could a supreme court be established using the Quran as guideline while keeping power out of the hands the Ulema , the class of Islamic religion leaders. Khan viewed the Quran as a source of inspiration rather than a dogmatic rule of law. The power to appoint the chief justices ,as well as members of an advisory committee called the Islamic Council, ensured the president could install moderates into the judiciary branch. Additionally, more decision making power was distributed to the lower courts and limited the right of appeal to only one in order to streamline the legal system. The foreign policies he had hoped to create with other post-colonial states were unique. Instead of focusing on geographic regions, common philosophies, or similar religious heritage, Khan wanted to join nations in pacts along the lines of common problems. The belief that differences between states could be overcome if they joined on problematic issues reminds one of the current problems of carbon emissions and the debates on global warming. In conclusion, the British imperial yoke, though removed, left Pakistan a broken colonial oxcart. Khan’s goal was to carve out a new type of Islamic Republic based on principals of peace in a diversified world. He firmly believed with the proper leadership and guidance the Pakistani people would be able to fulfill their destiny as members of a diversified world community. Unfortunately, his predictions of a war with India causing an economic collapse did become partially true. In 1965, a war with India decimated Pakistan’s economy and along with a few constitutional violations, resulted in the
public demanding his ouster in 1969.

Nazi Economic Policy in the Balkans

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The rise of Nazi Germany’s politic power in the 1930’s was remarkably similar to the policy used by Chancellor Bismarck in the late 19th century, which was based on a strategy of subverting weaker neighboring nations without threatening more powerful states in the region. Though this late 19th century policy unified Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II later disrupted the balance of power in Europe by attempting further expansion,which resulted in Germany’s defeat. Walking nearly the same path in the 1930s, Hitlter, based his foreign policies on development of
an autarkic state centered in a large secure economic area. Though he was encroaching the sphere of influence of the dominant European powers, Germany was applying a different form of statecraft. The political powder keg of the Balkan Peninsula, was economically tapped, to assist with Nazi Germany’s expansion. Economic methods of foreign policy were selected in this version Drang nach Osten (drive to the east), instead of blunt military might. Though Clausewitzian tactics were not initially used, neither were Adam Smith’s concepts of liberal economics as a method of penetrating the Balkans. Instead a different technique, bilateral trade agreements, was selected to gain influence over the weaker nations. The effort emphasized slow seduction by the use of gains from trade as compared to threat of immanent destruction. The unique aspect in this endeavor was the domestic economy of Germany was virtually isolated from outside influence. The Nazi government strictly regulated imports and exports, both trade and capital, gaining a bargaining tool to influence the trade preferences of the Balkan states. Additionally, the overall Nazi economic foreign policy began to shift from an international scope to one of a large area economy. To what degree of success this economic policy, as opposed to other alternatives, was used in obtaining future noneconomic / political goals in Southeastern European countries will depend on the defining parameters.

The chronological parameters and relative success of economic statecraft (and alternatives) in obtaining political goals, including the costs, will need defining. In regards to the first, the time period from the start of Hitler regime (January 1933) until Operation Barbarossa
(July 1941) shall be used. In the latter, economic statecraft through trade, for both controlled (closed) and liberal (open) need comparison. Finally, the alternative of using military statecraft, and its related costs will be examined. The framework for evaluating this case will align with the analytical case study checklist (Baldwin, Statecraft, 149). This outline considers policy creation, level of difficulty, utility of policy and alternatives, degree of success, summary based on evidence, and influence of other power bases. Additionally, Hirschmann’s analysis of foreign trade as a tool for the state will be examined. The four countries targeted by the Nazis as trade victims that are used as examples are Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary. The first two nations benefited from the Treaty of Versailles and can be classified as antirevisionist, the latter two lost territory, therefore have revisionist policies.₁ central work promoting the use of economic statecraft to increase power over other states was developed by Albert Hirschmann. He focused the theory on the principle that as a nation increased its wealth by extracting the wealth of another state through trade, it will increase its power over that nation. Such a trade relationship had the option of use as a policy of welfare or power, depending on political results desired in the targeted dependent nation.₂ If negative sanctions are to be used, Hirschmann believes it requires the backing by military threat. This may not always hold true as bilateral agreement is not without influence from third party states. Nazi Germany may not have been the only military threat to which they responded. Many other factorsinfluenced the Balkans into continued acceptance of the bilateral trade agreements. The threat of negative sanction was only one aspect.

To examine this case, though it is chronologically out of place, the Nazi forms of foreign policy other than economic statecraft the late 1930s will be examined. Two very successful cases of using military statecraft to project power involved Czechoslovakia and Austria These two
states of medium power bases and competition in the region were positioned between the between Nazi Germany and the Balkans. In these scenarios, three alternatives to economic statecraft classified by Harold Laswell were used: propaganda, diplomacy, and military statecraft.₃ Hitler utilized these in exactly that order to obtain absolute political and economic control over Czechoslovakia and Austria in a relatively short period of time. So extremely effective were these techniques, one can question the use of economic statecraft as a choice. A clear example of combined propaganda, diplomacy, and military statecraft is evident in the domination of Czechoslovakia. Propaganda with reference to Hitler’s clamored for the rights of the Germanic people in the Sudetenland, followed by diplomacy negotiated away the Czechoslovakian sovereignty eliminated French and British support, and finally with military statecraft, it occupied the country without instigating a war. Though the action was directed at the Czechs, the primary target was to test the resolve of Hitler’s stronger opponents and a secondary objective demonstrate thesuperiority of fascism to the Waeker Balkan states. The cost to success ratio was almost inestimable in favoring Hitler. Furthermore, in the Austrian case, the success of Anschluss with limited costs demonstrated the continued use of the propaganda, diplomacy, and military statecraft to obtain political goals. On March 25th, 1938, Hitler stated in a speech at Koenigsberg, Certain foreign newspapers have said that we fell on Austria with brutal methods. I can only say; even in death they cannot stop lying. I have in the course of my political struggle won much love from my people, but when I crossed the former frontier (into Austria) there met me such a stream of love as I have never experienced. Not as tyrants have we come, but as liberators.

The statecraft in this case used diplomacy to confront “foreign” opinion, and propaganda twisted military forces as freedom fighters. Applyin g Hirschmann’s viewpoint, the medium sized political strength (domestically and internationally) of these two nations could have withstood economic pressure eliminating economic statecraft as an effective choice. These alternatives to economic statecraft were more than confidence building for Hitler. They generated rapid successes at low cost in avoiding actually combat, domination that was fairly inexpensive to maintain, and bountiful economic rewards, by obtaining Austrian and Czechoslovak gold reserves.₄ This aggressive statesmanship went virtually uncontested, the costs to French and British international prestige as world leaders immeasurable. After the failure of halfhearted liberal economic policies did not improve the situation in the Balkans, it might also be considered a secondary objective of sending a signal to the region the viability of Fascism as an alternative. When considering the even weaker states of the Balkans in the early 1930s, was this alternative an option for the Nazis at that time?

The temporal effects of trade as a policy, as compared to the gamble of militarism, places an emphasis on obtaining objectives over a long run. Initially, Nazi Germany would have been confronted with two costs in using military statecraft towards the Balkans. The dependence on
the international system as an export market for needed foreign currency and as a source for foreign capital inflows. Combined with larger armies of the Western European powers, as well as heir ability to impose an economic blockade on Nazi Germany. This reinforces the preference for economic techniques in the Balkan as both a solution to the above problems and a method of extending political power without disturbing the European balance of power. Once the objective of controlling the Balkans economically and politically had begun to unfold, it was much easier for Hitler to eliminate the neighboring competitive power bases of Austria and Czechoslovakia. The alternative of military statecraft towards the Balkans seems to have been disqualified due to outside powers in opposition, but is it the only cost? The mosaic of Balkan peoples has a history of rebellion, tribalism, and suspicion towards outsiders. The cost to overtake, control, and unify the region would have been to high and outcome not guaranteed. The choices of economic statecraft remained between open free or controlled bilateral trade. Liberal economic policies were attempted to a degree in the post World War decade but were unsuccessful. Young democracies faced with corruption, lack of infrastructure, and minimal foreign capitalist interest trapped the semifeudal Balkans on the edge of industrialism.₅ Government regulated bilateral trade was a perfect match for the domestic economic polices of Nazi Germany. Then when and from where did this policy originate? What factors contributed to the choice of targeted trade as a solution? Hitler’s stance as an opportunist was not only in the political arena but economically as well. Surprisingly, the concept of penetrating the Balkans through bilateral trade was commenced before the Nazi control of the Reichstag, originating under Chancellor Brüning’s government (19301932).₆ Traditionally there existed historical ties
with Germanic peoples in the region as well as centuries of Hapsburg control extracting resources from the Balkan peninsula. A latecomer to the game of Imperialism left Germany with limited options for expansion and the need for internal strength to oppose its rivals, mainly Britain and France. The Balkan states, the stepchildren of the League of Nations, were ignored and became even further distraught by the Great Depression. The resultant Nazi trade policy perfectly fit into the vision of an autarkic state in need of secure strategic resources within the
region.

Another major influence in this policy was the continually limited amounts of German foreign currency reserves that were needed to obtain these vital materials. World trade between Germany and other manufacturing states was reduced in an era of high tariffs further restricting
purchasing power. Long term foreign credit was no longer available from America as it reeled under the weight the depression era. The fact that Germany could only obtain shortterm loans from its rival Britain, was a thorn in its political side. Furthermore, areas outside the Balkans
Scandinavia, South America, and the Soviet Union for example that could supply raw materials to Germany proved to be outside direct politic pressure, possibly cut off by a blockade, and most of all had the option of demanding currency as payment for commodities supplied. Without cash reserves or long term credit, an increasingly defiant Germany could not rearm, nor afford the stockpiling of strategic material was virtually impossible. The options therefore were extremely limited. The failure of liberalism (capital going to where it is most needed) as a solution to both, Germany and the Balkan Peninsula, was further compounded by the looming threat of the Bolsheviks’ irredentist appetite for expansion westward. Economic statecraft clearly was the least expensive and, just as crucial, least threatening move in the Balkans that could be made. An
international conflict sparked by military intervention was a quagmire that the Nazis could ill afford. The limited amount of foreign involvement by states favoring liberalism presented an opportunity for Nazi Germany to expand economically into the neglected region. The costs to
match or restrain this nonmilitary push outweighed any economic strategic concerns for Germany’s rivals. Other than American, French, and British companies’ interest controlled had a majority control over Romania’s petroleum industry, no critical trade dependency links coerced
the Balkan states. However, the balance of power was based on alliance “pactomania” (19331935), wherein France attempted to contain Germany by way of treaty .₇

The level of difficulty in using bilateral trade for Germany therefore would have been minimal, with relatively weak opposition from the Western European powers. The threat emanating from the Soviet Union, was dealt with by Hitler’s promising future sections of the
region into Stalin’s sphere of influence. The lack of direct foreign investment by the Nazis to develop and strengthen ties can be estimated as a variety of reasons. The need of scarce capital at home for rearmament, and had they displayed major investment in the area, may have alarmed
the Soviets as to Nazi intentions. Instead, as an affordable alternative, bilateral trade, with no expensive start up costs was implemented.
How Nazi Germany came to dominate Balkan trade, and can it be determined if it was a calculated long term plan or series of adjustments, should be considered. The technique used was not a centrally controlled hierarchy but multiple individual efforts to pry into the respective
markets. German agents were sent to the region to negotiate trade. Additionally, German investment in the region was limited to purchasing enough shares in trading companies to obtain a controlling interest. Therefore, it can be concluded that long term economic development of the region for future gains was not a goal but rather taking advantage of the system that was in place for future manipulation. Capturing the trade was not only to secure strategic resources but also to prevent future competition. It the needs to be established how these relationships evolved, either as part of a well laid out plan or by unforeseen circumstance, possibly aggressive opportunistic behavior on the part of the Nazis.
There were two distinct phases, initial agreements to capture trade (1932) followed by political pressure to keep it (1935). The primary phase evolved from falling agricultural prices on the world market after during the Depression. The long overdue process of land reform had previously taken place in the most of the Balkans following World War One, but was fully implemented and halfheartily supported. The massive of peasants on average received two hectares of land (five was considered a minimum for subsistence) and became a fragment social class. The lack of centralized organization compounded problems as farmers began to increase production to compensate for lower prices. The lack of of diversity in crop production to adjust to market needs was compounded by inefficiency. The lack of advanced techniques of fertilization and mechanization were only not affordable to the masses of peasantry, and it reduced their chances of ever being profitable once world market prices rebounded. The first countries to fall prey to agreements with Germany were Hungary and Austria in January 1932. In less than a year, six other states in the region followed suite. A political byproduct of these agreements and the need for state intervention to assistance their respective peasant land owning classes was increased centralized control. This increased government involvement in the economy placed them one step closer to fascist rule. The subsidies paid to farmers through tax breaks and guaranteed support prices were placing additional burdens on the Balkan governments. The idea of barter trade may be a credited to the Nazis but was also seeded during 1931 Prague conference of National banks. The president of the Austrian national bank suggested the idea of “currencyless” trade due to the lack of foreign currency reserves.₈

The second phase of the trade agreement was the result of the recovery of world market prices and Neuer Plan (19361940), the four year plan for war preparation, put in place by Hjalmar Schacht, German Minister of Economics (19351937). Supervising the program was the Nazi’s second in command, Herman Göring. The region realized its disadvantageous position in these agreements because it was losing the opportunity to sell on the world market for hard currency. Hungary, for example in 1937, attempted to refuse the new German agreements for increased demands of the Neuer Plan. It was met by a personal visit from Göring who stated, “Hungary must not leave Germany high and dry in this situation.” The result, Hungarian grain exports increased 25 per cent over the next year. Higher quotas of exports were matched by Nazi Germany setting prices lower than world market levels. Thus economic statecraft reached the next level as the Nazis extended market power over the governments of the Balkans. The behavior of the Nazi reaction was the primary factor in the evolution of the agreements. Since the Neuer Plan called for increased levels of trade, regardless of world market prices, they would have still demanded higher quotas and set prices. Exploring the actual mechanism and type of the bilateral trade agreements gives insight on how long term noneconomic gains were were obtained. Though the German economy lost the ability to consume imported goods, they substituted this loss by increased domestic production (and employment).

Any excess from this consumption was available for export. One of the main concerns for the Balkan states was the degree in which their economy was behind the industrialized world. Without the financial capital to purchase manufactured goods or invest in modernization to produce such goods, trade was the only alternative. The Nazis took advantage of this and often sent goods of inferior quality and selected the type of products to send. The consumption of these goods acted as a pressure relief valve that was controlled by the Nazis.

Additionally, by selecting the traded manufactured goods, items containing strategic materials could be withheld for domestic consumption. Britain as a competitor in the manufacture of machine tools, sold mostly highly specialized products. To eliminate this competition, the Nazi
trade multiuse machine tools that could be used by the Balkan states to produce military or consumer goods. Centralized control of imports and exports was accomplished by the creation of a medium of exchange labeled Sperrmarks. Agreements were made on the fixed value of each tradeable good and once delivered goods were credited into these closed accounts. This enabled increased central control on the quantity and type of trade as all transactions needed Nazi approval. Furthermore they often delayed delivery of goods (or never delivered) as the Sperrmark accounts were nonnegotiable. Gains from trade used to lure weaker trading partners into agreements were then manipulated by revaluing goods for an exchange rate favoring German exporters or even sending inferior quality goods.

Trade, of course, is a twoparty affair and examining the conditions in the Balkan Peninsula will display how economic vulnerability led to Nazi intrusion. Following World War One, the option of continued trade eastward as an alternative was eliminated by the fall of Tsarist Russia. Furthermore, the over supply of agricultural products in the capitalist world market during the 1920s reduced prices which further weakening the region. Also the concept of foreign aid by the major economic powers had not yet developed nor was accepted as it directly opposed
liberal economic values. The Balkans governments, though supposed new democracies, were still bound to traditional the political and economic conditions of the past. The domestic pressures handicapping progress pressured these governments to accept any reasonable method to maintain stability. Nazi Germany’s offer of favorable conditions of trade found easy targets. If political power over a state can be relative to the economic dependency of that state, to what degree were the Balkans dependent on trade with Nazi Germany? The following table shows a remarkable increase in the levels of trade:

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis Chart of German trade with selected southeast Europe 1933-1940.

A substantial increase can be seen on the level of trade with Nazi Germany, but are there any other factors that may support creating a condition of dependency? These weaker trading partners obviously directed more trade with Germany, but it also increased the Nazis dependence on the Balkans. This is derived by examining the Reichsbank gold and currency reserves in this same time period (1933 1940). Basically, the barter of goods for raw materials became increasingly important as gold and foreign currency reserves were needed for imports of strategic materials from sources outside the Balkans. As these reserves declined it reduced Nazi Germany’s ability to purchase strategic materials on the open market, therefore the relative importance of Balkan resources rose. In the chart below, there is a dramatic reduction in Nazi Germany’s reserves. When Hitler came to power, his domestic policies and strict Nazi supervision of trade produced a trade surplus under the New Plan (19341938). Increased military rearmament and maintaining a high level of living standards produced additional demands upon reserves. The trade surplus was not enough to compensate.

Line chart by Anthony Mrugacz for Foreign Trade Balances (nonbarter) and Reichbank Gold and Foreign Currency Reserves 1933-1937.

During 1933 to 1937, the level of foreign trade (imports and exports combined) remained fairly constant averaging 10,000 RMm per year. The low reserves of the Reichsbank in 1937, and dire need to obtain more seemingly coincide with the occupation of Austria (1938) and Czechoslovakia (1939), along with the seizure of their respective gold and currency reserves. It can be stated the barter trade from the Balkans was both to insufficient to meet Germany’s demands yet at the same time becoming more critical as a supply source. Germany’s dependency on a keeping a secure source for strategic materials is further displayed when analyzing the trade date with the Soviet Union. In 1933 the Soviet Union was ranked at the fourth largest trading partner with Germany and, by 1939, had dropped to the thirty third position. However in 1940, a year before the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union, imports from the Soviet Union to Germany nearly doubled and exports were almost the same as 1933 levels.

Such a rapid increase can only indicate demand was increasing and supply sources lagging behind for the Nazis Germany’s economic needs.
In the Nazi Germany’s case, no matter if it was a goal towards a large area autarkic economy or the reality of an economy strapped for international credit or investment, the value of barter trade increased for the Nazis. If such a level of interdependence existed, on what level
could the Nazis theoretically extend their political will over the Balkans without opposition? There are three viewpoints to this. On a bilateral level most definitely it favored the Nazis, the leadership of fragile Balkan state would choose remaining in power to avoid economic collapse
though dependent on as a trading partner. From a liberal economic viewpoint, the Balkan states had no alternatives for trade in either world markets through lack of buyers and again would be subject to Nazi influence. From Berlin’s authoritarian point of view, acting dominant yet with a good degree of constraint ,short of military action, would characterize a high level of political influence. The cost of maintaining the almost hegemonic system passed was way below alternative costs if the weaker states dropped from compliance with Nazi policies. Additional considerations beyond economic statecraft assisted the Nazis ability to eventually obtain political domination in the region. The political situation in the region was a complex linking of alliances and rivalries creating a fragile condition. The lack of any true unity of common goals and success at true collective security tipped the scales of political control in favor of the Nazis. It was not only bilateral agreements of guaranteed trade and Hitler’s promises of future territorial acquisition to these subordinate states that cemented the ties. A long standing goal that influenced the choices the Balkan states was basic survival. The threat of cutting off trade to the dependent states would have been obviously disastrous, yet it was the control of arms sales that tightened the noose around the necks of the Balkan states. As democracies floundered under economic conditions, the principles of selfdetermination edged towards nationalism. Militarism is a facet of nationalism, and the Balkans had begun imitating a fascist model of government. The inter war period was a time of massive rearmament in Eastern Europe and interstate suspicions dissolving the possibility for any real chance at collective security or united front to oppose Nazi influence.

The following list displays the inter war complexities of rivalries and alliances supports the concept of political disarray and vulnerability in Eastern and South Eastern Europe

Wars between 1919-1941

• Poland vs. Soviet Union (1920-1921),
• Hungary vs. Czechoslovakia and Romania (1918-1919)
• Poland vs. Germany and Soviet Union (1939)
• Italy vs. Greece (1940)

Territorial disputes:
• Poland Lithuania (Vilnius), Germany (Danzig and the corridor), Russia (border region)
• Czechoslovakia Poland (Teschen), Germany (Sudetenland), Hungary (Slovakian border), Soviet Union (CarpathoRuthenia)
• Hungary Austria (border), Yugoslavian (CroatianVojvodinaBanat area), Romania (Transylvania),
• Romania Soviet Union (Bessarabia), Bulgaria (Dobrogea)
• Yugoslavia Bulgaria (Macedonia), Albania (borders), Italy (Trieste),, Austria (Slovenia)
• Bulgaria Greece (border), Turkey (Border) Alliances, Agreements, and Pacts:
• France Poland (1921), Czechoslovakia (1924), Romania (1926),Yugoslavia (1927)
• AntiHungarian Little Entente Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania
• Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia (1920’s)
• Germany and Soviet Union: Rapallo (1922), MolotovRibbentrop (1939)

Annexations:
• Germany from Austria 1938, Czechoslovakia 1939

Only a fragile international political web maintained a balance of power. One element that was lacking in all of these relationships is that of an economic policy of aid or assistance. Other than Germany’s creation of trading block, there is not an identifiable effort to resolve the real domestic issues and base peace on prosperity. The continued internal turmoil and security concerns edged the Balkan states to the political right. The regional political instability allowed Nazis Germany the opportunity to exhibit leadership in the area. Not as a unifying force but
rather as a patronizing guide. As the insecure Balkan states desired to build up their military strength, the sale of armaments by the Nazis gave an additional lever of control. This dependency on Nazi Germany as a military arms supply source further enhanced their influence.

The sum of these dependencies in trade, arms, and ideology culminated to a level wherein Hitler’s demands in the region became irrefutable. One of the worst political scenarios for a state would be total loss of sovereignty, and the second, would be the inability to oppose another states actions in respecting one’s sovereignty. Hitler implemented the former against Austria and Czechoslovakia, the latter against Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania in 1941. These three nations allowed Nazi troops to use their territory to invade Yugoslavia and Greece after Mussolini’s
military statecraft had failed. Additionally, Romania succumbed to Hitler’s request to evacuate and surrender the territories of Northern Bukhovina and Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. Hitler again handed out the area of northern Transylvania from Romania to Hungary as if the League of Nations had never existed. Hitler had gone past a level of opportunism and was able to disregard international law. He had transformed economic levers into political leverage.

The success of economic statecraft in this case within the time frame of 1933 to 1941 was remarkable based on the level of power politics that Hitler used in the Balkans. However, it cannot be determined that desired longrange goal was achieved. The economic plan played out well and when political difficulties had appeared, Mussolini’s and Stalin’s influence attempts in the Balkans, they were diffused by Hitler’s command over the weaker trading partners. The long range goal was not completely obtained when defined by the following statement. A 1941 issue of the semiofficial Nazi journal Berliner Borsenzeitung stated it simply, “SouthEast Europe has to adapt itself to its natural character and stop industrialization.” The Nazis planned the future identical to the Hapsburg Dynasties rule, the continued policy of semifeudal extraction. But how did this plan fall short? The cost to maintain this extraction and impose political will on the region was time and military strength. The warm spring months of 1941 and five percent of the attack force destined for Operation Barbarossa were diverted to the region. Longterm goals were
not complete by these unforeseen costs.

Alternatives did appear before reaching this point in 1941. When the Neuer Plan was implemented and its higher quota and set price structure was opposed by the Balkan states. Nazi Germany chose political pressure to keep them in line. At this point some other positive action based on economic statecraft to assist the region, be it increased Nazi investment into Balkan economic infrastructure or a better price structuring, towards stability by economic progress was a viable alternative. The Nazis were unwilling to lower their living standards or reduce rearmament plans, allowing for no concessions towards their trading partners to benefit. Utilizing the Balkan raw material reserves and extraction rates during the late 1930s, an estimate of the number of years extraction could have been maintained can be calculated.₉

Table by Anthony Mrugacz for Years of estimated extraction until reserve depletion
Bulgaria ,Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary,

A clear opportunity to invest, increase efficiency, and share some of this wealth was not selected by Nazi Germany. Though Hitler planned for a subservient region as a secure source for strategic materials and protective flank, the Balkans sustained its historical tradition as a troubled area in relation to the more powerful European states. The Nazi goal of Aryan supremacy in this case reflects the Rousseau’s opinion on slavery in On Social Contract or Principles Of Political Right, “There are unfortunate situations in which liberty of one man can be preserved only at the expense of another man’s, and which the citizen can be perfectly free only if the slave is completely enslaved.”10

Notes – Nazi Economic Policy in the Balkans – Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

1 Dietrich Orlow. The Nazis in the Balkans: A case study of totalitarian politics. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1968)

2 Albert O. Hirschman, National power and the structure of foreign trade (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 7879.

3 Harold D. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: Peter Smith, 1950).

4 Additionally the military equipment seized in Czechoslovakia includes over 1,200 aircraft, 1,900 antitank and 2,200 field guns, 800 armored vehicles, 57,000 machine guns, and 630,000 rifles. Research Institute for Military History, Germany and the Second World War (New York : Oxford University Press, 1990), 334.

5 This trend continued, as of 1980 approxiamately 50% of the Balkan population remained outside of urban areas. David Turnock, ed., East Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union Enviroment and Society. (New York: Oxford University press, 2001), 133.

6 Brüning had also tried economic statecraft in forming a customs union with Austria (1931) that was derailed by France.

7 C. Grove Haines. The origins and background of the second world war. (New York: Oxford university press,
1947), 261.

8 T. Iván Berend, Decades of crisis : Central and Eastern Europe before World War II ( Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1998):269.

9 Research Institute for Military History, Germany and the Second World War,343.

10 Alan Ritter, ed., Rousseau’s Political Writings: Discourse on Inequality, Discourse on Political Economy on Social Contract (New York: W W Norton and Co Inc, 1988), 144145.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

Baldwin, David A. Economic statecraft. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985.

Barkai, Avraham. Nazi economics : ideology, theory, and policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.

Berend, T. Iván. Decades of crisis : Central and Eastern Europe before World War II . Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998.

Garrison, Walters, E. The other Europe : Eastern Europe to 1945.Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1988.

Haines, C. Grove. The origins and background of the second world war. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.

Hirschman, Albert O. National power and the structure of foreign trade. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980.

Koch, H.W. Aspects of the Third Reich. New York : St. Martin’s Press, 1985.

Lasswell, Harold D. Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Peter Smith, 1950.

Okey, Robin. Eastern Europe, 17401985 : feudalism to communism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.

Research Institute for Military History. Germany and the Second World War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Ritter, Alan, ed. Rousseau’s Political Writings: Discourse on Inequality, Discourse on Political Economy on Social Contract.New York: W W Norton and Co Inc, 1988.

Treadgold, Donald W. Twentieth century Russia, 6th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.

Turnock, David, ed. East Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union Enviroment and Society. New York: Oxford University press, 2001.

Khrushchev Denounces The Crimes Of Stalin: The Secret Speech

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

On February 25, 1956, Nikita Khrushchev, First Party Secretary of the Communist Party, delivered this speech to the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in Moscow, Russia. He originally wanted to make the speech public but hard-liners insisted that it be behind closed doors. There was a compromise in that he was allowed to brief all members of the Communist Party about his address concerning Stalin’s cult of personality and abuse while in power. Party membership at the time was six million and certainly it was no surprise when a copy was leaked to the CIA. The intent, as given in the actually speech, was threefold. Firstly to condemn Stalin and eliminate any future persons from leaning towards the cult of an individual as it was contrary to Bolshevik principles. Secondly to continue that work the Communist Party, through cooperation at all levels and self-criticism, had accomplished since Stalin’s death. This was of course to the strict adherence to Leninist guidelines in all ranks of the Communist Party. And lastly, to insure that Soviet Socialist democracy was put back on track according to their Constitution. The sum of these three was to insure that they would accomplish the task of building communism on pure Marxist-Leninist principles. This he stated could be accomplished in the next twenty years.

Upon examining Nikita Khrushchev’s career, his overall strategy was that the Soviet Union was nearing the point of reaching its goal of a true Communist State. Under Stalin the emphasis was on Socialism and industrial production through totalitarian means. The important step of denouncing Stalin was then to lead to an increased production of consumer goods, more openness in the arts and press, and improved government through the collectivization of leadership. One of the boldest moves to follow was the rehabilitation of many of those sent into exile in work camps and to restore the names of many of the wrongly accused citizens that were slaughtered in the purges of the 1930’s. Khrushchev hoped that by pointing out the errors made by Stalin, he could avoid calling into question the legitimacy of the Soviet system. In a sense it was a reaching out to a new generation and raising the expectations of the nation. It is important to note that at a Party Congress of the Communist Party, representatives from all Communist Nations are present. This bold strike at the Great “Vozhd” (boss), who had lead the Soviet in the Great Patriotic War against Hitler, was also an attempt to mend fences. Previously Stalin had alienated the Yugoslav Communist Leader Tito, and the secret speech was an effort to restore the ties between Belgrade and Moscow.

The consequences of his words were many and within seven years he was deposed and removed from leadership of the Communist Party. He had admitted he too had blood on his hands from the times of the Purges. In his defense, he said he was station in the Ukraine not Moscow, so he had to believe the guilt of those he was assigned to punish. Only after he claims did he come to know the atrocities of Stalin were against millions of innocent citizens. The move to realign other Foreign Communist leaders back towards Moscow created disbelief and shock. How could Khrushchev denounce the man who had led the Soviet Union to victory? The effect on the military was disheartening for their moral. The years following saw Khrushchev instigating many new domestic programs, aggressive action in foreign diplomacy, and even a failed attempt by the old Communist Party line to remove him from power. So can we look at his secret speech as the beginning of his end? Yes, I believe we can, when we factor in his blunders in Berlin and Cuba and his reforms that intimidated other Politburo members that he was going to far.

In conclusion the strategy at the time was also to diffuse tensions between the Soviet Union and the West. In order for his reforms to work, military spending was going to have to be reduced. In Khrushchev’s mind the Soviets needed tractors more than tanks and this thinking greatly offended the Military Industrial Complex. The denouncing Stalin and opening up the system to hints of democracy to create a plan of peaceful coexistence with the West was his intentions. It could have backlash into another bloodbath had hard-lined politburo members challenged him but on his side was the fact that many of them had been involved with Stalin’s purges and could be brought down and punished for their crimes. Unfortunately this brave move historically marks the peak of Nikita Khrushchev’s career as he offended too many with his daring vision for the future of the Soviet Union.

Books:
Billington, James. The Icon And The Axe. New York, 1970
Lawrence, John. A History of Russia. New York, 1993
Montef iore, Simon. Stalin The Court Of The Red Tsar. New York, 2003
Smith, Hedrick. The Russians. New York, 1976
Taubman,William. Khruschev The Man and his Era. New York, 2003
Treadgold, Donald and Ellison, Herbert. Twenteth Century Russia. Boulder, 2000

Internet:
Khrushchev, Sergei. “Khrushchev on Khrushchev: My father the Reformer”, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/07/reflections/

Describe the continuities between Russian foreign policy during Tsarist, Soviet, and post Soviet times.

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The continuity Moscow’s foreign policy is a troika of imperialism, autocracy, and nationalism. Strengthening the the wealth and defense of the central leadership as well as a top down flow of commands dominates throughout Russia’s history. Expansion does enrich the center and buffers on the periphery do make the state more secure, but there are underlining factors. The buffer states have typically gone under a dominating policy of Russification in an effort to immunize them from outside influences and protect Russia from being infected with foreign ideology. Another driving factor from Peter the Great, through the Communist era, and continuing today, is the drive for a warm water seaport. Foreign intervention has also historically used to promote nationalism as a distraction from troubling domestic issues. Russia typically regards its neighbors as irredentist enemies, and politically aligns with states to flank them. England against Napoleon, Castro annoying the U.S., and Ho Chi Minh to offset China are good examples. The debate continues on whether outside forces cause a Russia to behave in a reactionary mode, or the unique history and geopolitical situation has caused a political evolution controlling its foreign policy actions.

Describe how sports and politics go hand in hand. Use examples from the Olympics that show that countries, athletes, and nonstate actors use port for their own purposes.

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The Cold War’s major players, the U.S. and U.S.S.R, and the interactions during the 1980 Moscow and 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games provide the solid examples of the sport/politics partnership. Examining the Soviet behavior, that as an ideological pariah, little cooperation in the field
of sport took place outside their sphere of influence. Stalin avoided involvement in international sports unless victory was certain for the U.S.S.R. (similar to his attitude on foreign policy). The arrival of Khrushchev, with his efforts to deStalinize, combined with the growing might of the state, allowed entry in the 1954 Olympic Games. Though the West complained of the “professional” nature of the Soviet athletic system, it did allow its participation. One may also notice that after 1954, Soviet expansion was also on the rise assisting wars of national liberation throughout the third world. The political rhetoric in international affairs and sport would continue to escalate over the next three decades. Domination in these areas walked hand in hand with growing criticism of Soviet policies. Using sport to show the superiority of the soviet system involved the traditional open cooperation with the subversive lining. The boasting of economic, military, and athletic abilities were a true facade. The use of sport enhancing drugs, “professional” athletes, a corrupt economic system based on quantity not quality, and military forces built on numbers not effectiveness were intertwined into a policy bent on world domination. This mixture of facade and and rhetoric created tensions with the West, especially the main opponent, the U.S. Once an avenue for the individual and true representation of the solidarity of

mankind , the Olympic games became another front in the battle between opposing ideology. The American decline in influence and rise in Marxists states in the late 1970’s culminated with a bold Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The claim of being called in did not bid well in world politics resulting in a U.S. boycott of the 1980 games in Moscow, and the event’s stature was forever tarnished by politics. The Kremlin countered by withdrawing form the 1084 Los Angeles games on technical issues in response to the capitalist nature of the event, crime and pollution there. Unfortunately these events were only the beginning as the games are now a showcase to increase stature by using economic and technological aspects of a hosting state (Beijing 2008). The addition of being a opportune target for terrorists (Munich 1972) further spotlights the political side eroding the true nature of the gathering. The research into the relationship between sports and politics since the ancient Olympic games offers a interesting opportunity to study the behavior of a state.

Compare and contrast George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in terms of their foreign policy record.

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The similarities in both situations dealing with rising regions of power (Red China and the European Union), rekindling old allies from the late 20thcentury in traditional spheres of influence, trade and energy concerns, and dealing with terrorism. Contrasts are more on the actually methods and results are remarkably polar opposites. Each has invoked cooperation and adherence to a new spirit of cooperation and abiding by international law, yet has disregarded this when obtaining objectives. Putin has had great success in dealing with terrorism to raise popular support for his actions. The Russian Federation has a real daily threat of terrorist activity due to its proximity to radical Islamic groups. It has been an effective tool domestically in consolidating power and diminishing democracy. Russian society has a tradition of accepting safety over westernstyle freedoms. The front as a new nation sans communism is being used in energy issues but unfortunately Soviet style domination over dependents on this oil seems to again be the norm. Successful in increasing the wealth of the state but not the populace had been accomplished in the short term. However, such dependency will in the long run cripple Russia if it has such a narrowly based economy. Trade has been a concern but the inability to change internally is a major obstacle.

The vehicle of negotiations can not overcome internal economic issues and corruption in Russia which again damage it in the long term. Putin short term record is spectacular putting Russia back in the same position it held a few decades ago, especially in showing the ineffectiveness of American idealism as foundation for foreign policy. The success in foreign policy is just a facade to hide the internal cracks in the domestic system, which should eventual implode. Tackling the same issues and new spirit using similar techniques, Bush has had little effectiveness. The divide between the US and EU has grown mainly to to the Hippocratic and hubris actions taken under is directives. Rather than being dependent on oil exports, the import side has completely back fired as all efforts to resolve the problem were taken on shortterm quick fixes, such as the invasion of Iraq. These failed efforts by an insecure leader were due to Bush’s inability to lead the nation in the hard choices and changes necessary to be ready for the 21st century. The guise of countering terrorism, a far off threat, by suppressing domestic political opponents and wasting of the nation’s financial future had been a sham. Losing support at home and abroad has eroded the U.S.’s legitimacy as a world leader and curtailed its ability to project power in social and economic issues. The failed policy will result in a more isolationist states over the next decade when US leadership is needed most. Bush has validated the typical Russia hard stance on foreign policy as the effective way for the near future. Both leaders actions are just a part of the historical RussoAmerican seesaw on international politics.

Describe how Putin is using oil and gas to enhance his and Russia’s power?

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

Five areas exists where Putin is using energy as a controlling factor in increasing his Russia’s power. Domestically by reeling in the bandits that seized the country’s energy sector, bolstering public support, maximizing the state’s treasury, and with state control of the sector making it a usable tool for the Kremlin in foreign policy. Secondly, the lost allies to the west, used as a traditional buffer to western influence, is being slowly strangled in efforts to realign with Moscow. this is especially prevalent in Belarus and the Ukraine but having similar effect in Southeastern Europe where autocracy is reemerging. In the third case, having the European Union dependent on Putin’s control the energy flow will increase the growing divide between Europe and the U.S. On the fourth, the challenge of Red China’s economic growth and its exponential energy needs is a threat to the bloc of Asian economic tigers. Offering an alternative, Putin needs the region as a flanking force to Beijing’s underbelly. In closing, the multitude of smaller impoverished states faced with rising energy prices and its affect on food costs, will be easy targets of influence for the oil reserve and cash rich Russian Federation. Facing social upheaval, these resource deficient sates could easily become puppets to the Kremlin’s wishes.

Compare and contrast the foreign policy of Harry Truman, Josef Stalin, and Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

Always on guard against capitalism as a lethal enemy, Stalin often made errors in foreign policy. Assuming the West would devour itself, the lessons he learned from the Nazi invasion hardened his stance. The number on goal of foreign policy became survival of the state rather than world domination of MarxistLeninism. The first stage, while understanding a new world would arise after the war, involved cooperation with the U.S. Roosevelt and Stalin knew that cooperation was absolutely essential. Stalin was not yet dealing with an America that reached hegemon status and the willingness to project hard power around the globe. Certainly, he planned stage two of his policies to create a buffer zone and a controlled sphere of influence in Eastern Europe well before the war ended. The finally stage due to the atomic age and Truman’s proactive responses to Soviet moves, placed foreign policy aims at priority of matching the levels of American power while avoiding direct allout confrontation. Roosevelt’s foreign policy came from his understanding that the new world order would no longer be Eurocentric. His goals came from an ideology of how the world should be in the postwar era based on the United Nations. The cooperation, and often appeasement, with Stalin was done understanding that the Soviet Union, as the other potential world power would have to be a cooperative partner for his policies to succeed. With less emphasis and fears on protecting a geographically isolated U.S., he could offered to offer compromises in effort obtain world peace. Roosevelt was willing to sacrifice in this cooperation while always retaining the core of his aims. His position as a president
through America’s most difficult years, surely made him sympathetic towards Stalin ,as he understood the exactly what it took to lead a nation. After the fall of Berlin, I am sure his tone would have changed dramatically had Stalin upset this core with aggressive actions, causing Roosevelt to in turn to be a more vocal and active opponent.

Truman’s arrival on the scene brought the reactionary fears of the U.S. which now viewed the world in two camps. Foreign policy became hard lined in defense of further Soviet advancement in Europe with the days of mutual cooperation rapidly eroding. Truman, as opposed to Roosevelt, had the advantage of seeing how this new ideological world order played out with Stalin’s actions countered his prewar agreements Bolstering American forces and having the advantage of nuclear weapons, his polices countered the Soviets not only with words threatening actions. As per Roosevelt’s understanding that the U.S. would fill a vacuum with a devastated European continent, Truman policies projected a hard power in the face of the Soviets. The resolve Truman displayed in dealing with what he called a “son of a bitch”, was not a gamble but just as pragmatic, turning Stalin’s policies from openly aggressive to a more cautious stance.

Describe and explain the challenges that Nikita Khrushchev faced when he decided to install nuclear missiles in Cuba. What were the consequences of his actions?

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The challenges faced were on two sides of the Iron Curtain, causing Khrushchev to gamble with this move aimed at giving true strategic military equality. At home, Khrushchev had isolated himself by his style of nonadvisable decision making, detaching himself from reality in the creation of his own personal solutions to domestic problems, and needed to keep moment going to support the legitimacy of the Marxist movement as it enter the next phase of development, socialism. Since the end of WWII, an increase of the Soviet Union’s military might was equally matched by its paranoia of the West. Khrushchev believed in the superiority of the U.S.S.R.’s system and it would eventually surpass capitalism. However, he understood the Soviet’s vulnerability and until that day, the bluffs and boasts might not hold off the West.

Moving on to the international challenges, the placement on the international level was not entirely difficult. Believing Kennedy was weak , playing on Castro’s fears of a US invasion, lacking visible governmental opposition from the politburo bureau, and the tactical ability to execute the installment, all were factors supporting this dice roll. Hoping to truly stalemate the U.S. strategic nuclear attack capability would put him in a better position in to take Berlin, erode the European alliance with Washington, and increase the leadership role of the Kremlin being challenged by Moscow. It failed due to underestimating the the Kennedy brothers. The equivalent of striking out with the bases loaded sealed Khrushchev fate. Not only did it remove him from power but set time back on his antiStain reforms and increased tensions with the West. A more conservative leadership not willing to tackle domestic issues dominated Moscow for the next two decades leading to decay. The ultimate consequence was that momentum of the Soviet system was lost. One might define the staring point of the collapse of the Soviet Union as this episode in superpower relations.

Compare and contrast Russian and Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia from the Vietnam War to the present.

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The foreign policies of these two states have retained basic issues that have been unresolved since the 19th century. Focusing on ideological intentions would distract the from the true intentions of these pragmatic opponents in their competitive goals in Southeast Asia. Both having a long contested border region and disadvantages expanding to the west. The wealth of opportunities of are numerous but the number one issue is driving a push here remains the common border area and Russia has a priority interest in having allies on China’s southern flank. Economic partnerships, safe sea trade routes, energy issues, and issues. Each has a hold over relationship from the 20th century, China in Cambodia and Russia in Vietnam. such as terrorism and drug trafficking are other areas of interests.

The recent growth of the Southeast Asian tigers with light industries, energy needs, and fear of a Red Chinese hegemon places Russia at an advantage. Russia’s economy being based on heavy industry offers a perfect match for trade. The technologies that Russia has expertise in, especially in oil extraction, balances well with the electronics and consumer goods produced in SE Asia. ASEAN unification as a viable regional bloc facilitates easy negotiation on the issues of terrorism and drug trafficking. Russia is not seen as a threat, as compared to Red China, and with expertise in combating subversive elements matched with its need for a warm water seaport for its Navy, becoming a security partner in the region is an obtainable issue. Finally, in flanking the Red Chinese to the south, thus protecting the South China Sea’s oil reserves and situated in the oceanic trade routes, will keep the Beijing’s encroachment into Siberia at bay.

China sees the region with a historic right to trade and disdain for foreign intervention. More adapt in Asiatic ways, they are using goodwill towards developing the states poorer states (Cambodia for example), have relaxed their position on the regional oil reserves, and with a longstanding ethnic population throughout the region, have a solid base to work with. Time is considered a resource by the Chinese and the projects in the region are based on longer term goals to develop hegemonic control. China is respected in the area and needs to keep its image up in the area rather than being a controlling political bully. Its hard line aggressive stance has been softened towards Taiwan and Japan, and has become active in defusing issues with North Korea, in an attempt to improve its image in the region. Once the hard road to becoming a true superpower is obtained, Red China will most likely return to harder policy stance in the region.

What are the causes and goals of international anarchism and terrorism?

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The causes and goals of anarchism and terrorism must be put into a chronological perspective. The movements (and the tactics used) came into prominence in the 19th century during industrialization in an era dominated by monarchic rule and a class based society. The root causes came from the repression of human development as compared to major ideological needs for new methods to overthrow the ruling systems. Comparing both to fascism and communism demonstrates the birth of anarchy and terrorism. Fascism and communism commenced from internal conditions against the domestic governments. Anarchism and terrorism are typically aimed at more powerful states from outside a region repressing it. Fascism and communist movements targets a society as whole where as anarchism and terrorism inspire an oppressed individual. The goals of anarchism and terrorism are similar to fascism and communism as they are fronts for a minority of a society to assume power.

This seems contradictory in anarchism case but some frame work has to be established no matter how minimal. The goals of these two movements are very peculiar. Created due to the poor environment needed to foster human development, the end product will also suppress this. Terrorism typically has a goal of a hard line ideological policy, anarchism’s theories close to none, so what they are attempting to create, if successful, have little hope of sustaining themselves. Looking at the ideological bastion of Islam, Iran, and the poor conditions there in the
economy and human development, one can not see the goals are nothing more than a journey down a dead end road. Anarchy, as witness in the Ukraine during the early part of the 20th century was a victim of its own belief system. The causes therefore reinvents itself after obtaining the goals. These two ideological system only survive when combating an outside force or otherwise descend into political cannibalism.

After World War I a bumper crop of East European states appeared. The USSR reestablished hegemonic control over many of these states after WWII. In 1991 the USSR collapsed and the East European states appeared as sovereign nations. In the 1990s and the early part of the twentyfirst century, Yugoslavia imploded and seven new states emerged counting Kosovo. Yet most of these East European states have gained or are trying to gain admission to the EU, which will attenuate their sovereignty, and to NATO. What is going on? Is
national sovereignty now giving way to regional “market states” or economic Blocs where culture is respected but political and economic independence is subordinated to regional and group interests? Are economic hegemons reappearing as new types of empires? What is Russia’s policy toward these developments?

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The 20th century power was based on military might of larger states and alliances formed to ensure the survival of the smaller ones. The 21st century platform for power exists in economic strength. The goals are basically the same amongst the major powers only the methods have changed. Europe as a whole truly has learned from the devastation suffered that war is not the solution. Today trade agreements replace treaties of mutual defense. in this giving up sovereignty? Europe has and will always be East versus West. The ability to stand off the Soviet Union was accomplished by the formation of NATO. The Strength of NATO was not only backed by American hard power and political resolve but technical terms of shared leadership and common technologies. Relating this to the EU, using a standard caliber weapon has been replaced by a standard currency. Shared leadership gives voice to even the smallest states in the EU which in reality more advantages than the option of a weak state dependent on a foreign power as an ally.

An advantage of the EU is that it increases sovereignty by stabilizing the economy of a state. A more powerful Western Europe will also be able to break free from American influence as the projected military umbrella over them is not as necessary as during the Cold War. What does threaten sovereignty? If states are “unionized” the chance of warding off the threat to the east, Russia’s control of energy supplies, is weakened. Could a Latvia, Slovakia, or Ukraine with stand the the tap of fuels being cut off on their won? Definitely not, but by building economic alliances and trading partners, this will help them retain sovereignty. Smaller states on the European map are basically the same as one hundred years ago, only the type of threats to them have changed. Better to cooperate and survive in the EU than face the type of partnership that would evolve if slipping into the Russian Federation’s sphere of influence. The opportunities and chance for survival are only obtainable looking westward. the smaller European states are familiar with their status amongst the nations of Europe and having limited sovereignty is what they are accustomed too. The alternative, domination from the east, offers the same as centuries past. The Russian Federation rise puts on the economic playing with basically the same political stance viewing the West as a threat and desiring to capture its buffer zone of the former eastern bloc.

Is Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia a parallel to Texas’ declaration of independence from Mexico, Mexico declaration of independence from Spain, Chechnya’s declaration from Russia? Is national sovereignty congruent with real distribution of power.

Critical Thinking Historical Analysis – Anthony Mrugacz

The circumstance surrounding Kosovo’s declaration of independence are unique as compared tothe other scenarios. By comparing these, it will be seen national sovereignty is not congruent with the real distribution of power. Other cases witnessed a controlling power, while in a weakened state with multiple distraction, giving an opportune moment for rebellious groups holding a minority opinion, to settle their political differences by military action action. The earlier movements in Texas and Mexico, did not have to contend with oppressors whom could project hard power to stop them. In Chechnya, Moscow was able to muster the strength with devastating results. The real distribution of power was
with these rebellious groups as their revolts were not supported by outside forces. Even in the case of Chechnya the case be made as the history of rebellion there shows the Russians could not subdue the region. Two of the three survived after declaring independence demonstrating they did have power and the ability to sustain themselves. Chechnya could sustain itself, however, the economic importance of the region and the possibility of linking more to the West or Islamic world, would threaten more of the Russian Federation’s territorial sovereignty. Kosovo, which contains a majority opinion of ethnic Albanians wanting sovereignty, is powerless to obtain and sustain sovereignty on its own. That power is directed externally for support. The geopolitical and economic situation there makes it more of a stepchild being used for political purpose. Take away the West’s resolve, the UN stance on ideological support, NATO’s dominance of the region, the EU’s focus of keeping trouble out of its backyard that would impede its growth , would result in this declaration collapsing. Moscow could surely project its power into the region but with trouble along all its borders with former satellites and republics, could not stand up to the West. The Kosovo case does not correspond with national sovereignty as power to enforce it does not come from the center.

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